Idaho Law Review
Volume 57

Number 2

Article 7

November 2022

Promises Made, Promises Broken: The Anatomy of Idaho’s School
Funding Litigation
John E. Rumel

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review

Recommended Citation
John E. Rumel, Promises Made, Promises Broken: The Anatomy of Idaho’s School Funding Litigation, 57
IDAHO L. REV. (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review/vol57/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Idaho Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information,
please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: THE ANATOMY OF
IDAHO’S SCHOOL FUNDING LITIGATION
JOHN E. RUMEL *
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses the protracted Idaho Schools for Equal
Educational Opportunity (“ISEEO”) K-12 school funding litigation in
Idaho – litigation initiated by plaintiffs under Idaho’s state
constitutional education clause in the early 1990s, which resulted in
six reported decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court and two additional
decisions in follow-on federal and state court cases and which,
although leading to the state Supreme Court’s affirming the trial
court’s determination that the Idaho legislature had failed to
adequately fund public education under the thoroughness provision of
the education clause, resulted in the state high court’s dismissing the
case without addressing the remedial phase of the case or granting
plaintiffs a remedy. The Article addresses the ISEEO cases in the
context of judicial and scholarly treatment of state constitutional K-12
school funding cases. Specifically, the Article opines that the Idaho
Supreme Court’s failure to address the remedial phase of the case
could be fairly predicted by its prior decisions in the ISEEO matter, was
likely motivated by, among other reasons, a desire to avoid a
constitutional confrontation with the Idaho legislature, and, although
within the realm of school funding cases decided and scholarly views
held nationally, given the stakes involved – the adequacy of public
education being funded and delivered to Idaho’s schoolchildren – and
the manner in which the remedial phase of the case was (not) decided
– without a hearing, briefing or evaluation of evidence, constituted a
dark day in the annals of Idaho jurisprudence. The Article concludes
by discussing and analyzing possible post-ISEEO steps forward by
Idaho K-12 school funding advocates, including use of preclusion
doctrines to build on the successes of the ISEEO plaintiffs and/or
renewed use of the Idaho citizens’ initiative process to increase
funding for school funding in the state
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago, two groups of plaintiffs initiated legal proceedings
which were intended to have a profound effect on the state of K-12 public
education in Idaho, a subject area which the United States Supreme Court has
recognized as “’perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments’”1 and whose “grave significance . . . both to the individual and to our
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., University of California Hastings College
of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz. The Author wishes to thank attorney and former Idaho
Supreme Court Justice Robert Huntley who represented the ISEEO plaintiffs and retired former Deputy
Attorney General Michael Gilmore who represented the State defendants in the Idaho school funding
matter. Messrs. Huntley and Gilmore provided valuable insights to the Author concerning the ISEEO
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society cannot be doubted.”2 During more than fifteen of those years, under a case
entitled (and with a lead plaintiff named) Idaho Schools for Equal Educational
Opportunity (“ISEEO”), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled on the merits of appeals and
issued Opinions an unprecedented (for Idaho) six different times, a number which
does not include follow-on cases litigated in both state and federal court.3 This
Article will address the Idaho high court’s judicial decision making in the ISEEO
matter, as well as its impact on public education in the State.
Part A of the Article will discuss the ISEEO cases, its predecessor Idaho
Supreme Court K-12 public school funding decision, and follow-on cases litigated in
both federal and Idaho state court.4 In particular, Part A will discuss the protracted
and tortuous path, as well as the aftermath of the Court’s ISEEO Opinions, which (a)
permitted litigation of a portion of the ISEEO plaintiffs’ Idaho constitutional
education clause claims on the merits, (b) defined the contours of the thoroughness
provision of the Idaho education clause, (c) rejected attempts by the Idaho
legislature, via statutory enactments, to derail the ISEEO litigation, (d) affirmed the
trial court’s determination that the Legislature had failed to adequately fund public
education under the thoroughness provision, and (e) retained jurisdiction over the
remedial phase of the case only to subsequently dismiss the case without
addressing the remedial issues or granting the ISEEO plaintiffs a remedy and
without conducting a hearing or issuing an Opinion concerning that matter, thereby
causing plaintiffs to seek recourse in federal and (again) in state court.5
Part B will analyze significant aspects of the Court’s ISEEO decisions—primarily
the Court’s decisions vis a vis the district court’s appointment of a special master
and, ultimately, to retain jurisdiction and dismiss the case without evaluating the
need for or granting a remedy.6 As to the latter decision, Part B will evaluate the
available evidence concerning the reasons why the Court made the decision and
assess the bona fides of the Court’s decision as well.7 Part B will conclude that the
litigation and, more important, represented their respective clients in the finest tradition of Idaho’s
practicing Bar. The Author also wishes to thank Professor Christine Rienstra-Kiracofe for her valuable
input on an earlier draft of this Article and his College of Law former and current Research Assistant Pat
Fackrell and Brandon Helgeson, respectively, for their similarly valuable input and research on this
Article. Lastly, the Author would like to thank his faculty colleagues for their comments and input when
the Author presented an early draft of the Article at a University of Idaho College of Law Faculty
Scholarship Retreat. The usual admonitions and disclaimers apply, i.e. the opinions expressed by the
Author in this Article, as well as any mistakes or omissions in or not in it, are the Author’s alone.
1.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (quoting Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
2.
Id. at 30.
3.
The Author is not aware of any other case in Idaho that has spawned six or more reported
decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court.
4.
See infra notes 13–227 and accompanying text.
5.
Id.
6.
See infra notes 228–317 and accompanying text.
7.
See infra notes 250–317 and accompanying text. The Author views this portion of the
Article as a “first pass” concerning assessing the Court’s reasons for dismissing the ISEEO matter without
conducting a remedial phase of the case or granting a remedy – a task made more difficult by the Court’s
never making any public statement at a hearing or via an opinion to explain or justify its decision. The
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Court’s decision to not conduct the remedial phase of the case was likely based on,
among other things, a desire to avoid a confrontation with the Idaho Legislature.8
Equally, if not more, significant, Part B will conclude that, although the Court’s
decision fell within the range of school funding cases decided and scholarly views
held nationally, given the stakes and interests involved in the case—the adequacy
of public education being funded for and delivered to the schoolchildren of Idaho—
the Court’s decision was a dark day in the history of Idaho jurisprudence which
resulted in both the Court and the Legislature not living up to their state
constitutional duties.9
Part C will conclude by analyzing possible steps forward after the ISEEO
litigation, i.e. steps that might be or already have been taken to further the ISEEO
plaintiffs’ goals of adequately funding K-12 public schools in Idaho.10 Specifically,
Part C will address strategies involving the possible use of judicial preclusion
doctrines by new plaintiffs to take advantage of the Court’s justiciability and liability
determination in ISEEO V to once again pursue school funding goals.11 Part C will
also assess the possible renewed use of the citizens’ initiative process to increase
K-12 school funding, a process that was launched in 2019, but not consummated
because of the COVID-19 pandemic.12
Author hopes that further investigative efforts by a journalist or legal historian will ultimately reveal a
more definitive assessment of the Court’s reasoning than any insight this Article may be able to bring to
the endeavor.
8.
See infra notes 286–295 and accompanying text.
9.
See infra notes 296–317 and accompanying text. Idaho has ranked extremely low in perpupil funding throughout the years, with a United States Census Bureau report for 2010-11 showing that
Idaho spent less per K-12 public school student than 48 other states. Kevin Richert, Idaho Ranks No. 50
in
Per-Pupil
Spending,
IDAHO
EDUCATION
NEWS,
(May
21,
2013)
https://www.idahoednews.org/news/idaho-ranks-no-50-in-per-pupil-spending/ (citing Mark Dixon,
Public Education Finances: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013)). Idaho State officials have attempted to
minimize this problem, suggesting that “the amount of money a state spends per child isn’t a silver bullet
to high academic achievement.” Emilie Ritter Saunders, Superintendent Luna: Per-Student Funding Isn’t
the
Only
Measure
of
Success,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO:
STATE
IMPACT
IDAHO,
https://stateimpact.npr.org/idaho/2012/06/21/superintendent-luna-per-student-funding-isnt-the-onlymeasure-of-success/ (June 12, 2012, 4:00 PM). The Author agrees that money is not a panacea and that
other factors may contribute to low school quality and student achievement; however, when school
funding has been so consistently and comparatively low in Idaho for so many years, the Author also
believes that denying the importance of funding for public schools is reckless and ignores the
demonstrated causal relationship between school funding, quality of schools and student achievement.
See Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403, 405-06 (N. J. 1990) (noting “that even if not a cure,
money will help, and that . . . students are constitutionally entitled to that help” and further that “what
money buys—improved staff ratios, higher teacher salaries, expanded course offerings, more
equipment—makes a difference” and finally that “[t]his ‘conventional wisdom’ is . . . the fundamental
premise of decision-making by those in charge of education in the districts and in the state”). For these
reasons, the Author and this Article operate on the premise that money or lack thereof makes a
significant difference in the quality of K-12 public education.
10. See infra notes 318–344 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 319–326 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 327–344 and accompanying text. As of this writing, plaintiffs have pursued
litigation challenging the legality of state systems for funding K-12 public schools under state
constitutional provisions in approximately forty-five states. See School Funding Court Decisions,
SCHOOLFUNDING.INFO, www.schoolfunding.info/school-funding-court-decisions/ (last visited February 19,
2021); see also Larry L. Obhof, School Finance Litigation and the Separation of Powers, 45 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 539, 543 & n.18 (2019); James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on
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II. DISCUSSION
A. The Cases
1. Thompson v. Engelking—Pre-ISEEO Judicial Treatment
Prior to the ISEEO cases, the Idaho Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether Idaho’s system of funding K-12 public education complied with the
requirements of both the United States and Idaho Constitutions in Thompson v.
Engelking.13
In Thompson, the district court determined that Idaho’s primary and
secondary public school funding system complied with the Equal Protection clauses
of the United States and the Idaho Constitution, but violated the Idaho
Constitution’s requirement that the legislature maintain a uniform system of public
schools.14 On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision
on plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.15 In so holding, the Court first concluded that
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez16 foreclosed a federal equal protection challenge under the
deferential (to the legislature) rational basis test.17 The Court further concluded,
under that same rational basis test, and even though significant financial disparities
in funding existed amongst school districts across the state, the Legislature “acted
rationally and without unconstitutional discrimination in setting up a system of
financing, wherein a large portion of revenues for the public schools are levied and
raised by and for the local school districts.”18 As such, plaintiffs’ claim under Idaho’s
state constitutional equal protection clause likewise failed.19
The Court, however, reversed the district court’s holding that the Legislature
had failed to comply with the uniformity provision of the Idaho Constitution.20 In
this regard, Article IX, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
School Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL. REV. 463, 464 (2004).
This Article will primarily focus on Idaho’s ISEEO school funding litigation and related Idaho cases;
however, without attempting to be encyclopedic, the Article will cite to and discuss cases outside of
Idaho and secondary sources to place in context the Idaho Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the
panoply of issues taken up by the Court during the course of the ISEEO and follow-on litigation.
13. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 96 Idaho 793 (1975).
14. Id. at 636–38, 96 Idaho at 794–95.
15. Id. at 636, 96 Idaho at 794.
16. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriquez, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the Texas legislature’s system of funding K-12 public education as against a federal
equal protection challenge, holding that the system was rationally related to Texas’s governmental
interest in allowing for local control of school district fiscal matters. Id. at 47–55. In reaching its decision,
the Court refused to apply the more exacting strict scrutiny test, rejecting plaintiff’s arguments that
Texas’s legislative scheme–even though it resulted in substantial disparities in funding as between local
school districts—constituted a suspect classification because it discriminated, in among other ways, on
the basis of wealth, id. at 17–29, or that it violated Texas parents’ and schoolchildren’s fundamental
rights, including the right to an education. Id. at 29–40.
17. Thompson, 537 P.2d at 642, 96 Idaho at 800.
18. Id. at 642–47, 96 Idaho at 800-05.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly
upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature
of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough
system of public, free common schools.
The Court, reviewing the debates of Idaho’s founders and other legislators
concerning the meaning of the above-quoted provision, concluded “those debates
fail . . . to support the trial court's conclusion that the education article requires a
public education system wherein equal amounts are expended per pupil on a
statewide basis.”21 Based on that reading, the Court held that “Art. 9, and in
particular, Sec. 1, does not guarantee to the children of this state a right to be
educated in such a manner that all services and facilities are equal throughout the
State.”22 Instead, the Court determined that the provision required only uniformity
of curriculum, further holding that
A general and uniform system, we think, is . . . one in which every child
in the state has free access to certain minimum and reasonably
standardized educational and instructional facilities and opportunities
to at least the 12th grade—a system administered with that degree of
uniformity which enables a child to transfer from one district to another
within the same grade without substantial loss of credit or standing and
with access by each student of whatever grade to acquire those skills
and training that are reasonably understood to be fundamental and
basic to a sound education. . . .23
Having rejected all of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to Idaho’s system of
financing K-12 public education, the Court reversed the decision of the district
court.24
2. ISEEO I—Judicial Supremacy in Constitutional Matters, Justiciability and
Thoroughness
The Idaho Supreme Court again took up state constitutional challenges to
Idaho’s K-12 school funding system—in a legal and political journey that would last
for nearly twenty years—in Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v.
Evans (“ISEEO I”).25 In ISEEO I, during Summer 1990, a group of citizens/taxpayers,
21. Id. at 647–48, 96 Idaho at 805–06.
22. Id. at 647, 96 Idaho at 805.
23. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d at 652, 96 Idaho at 810.
24. Id. at 653, 96 Idaho at 811.
25. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 123 Idaho 573 (1993)
[hereinafter ISEEO I]. Scholars categorizing school funding cases have used a “wave” metaphor in
describing the cases over the years. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC.
219 (1990) (initially coining the term). Each wave represents a different theory of liability under the
United States Constitution or a state counterpart: the first wave stands for equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the second wave stands for equity under state constitutional equal
protection and education clauses; and the third wave stands for adequacy under state constitutional
education clauses. Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights and Remedies, 27 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y,
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school districts, superintendents and a superintendent’s association filed two
lawsuits, later consolidated, against various state officials, including the Legislature
and the Governor.26 One of the lawsuits again alleged that Idaho’s system of
funding K-12 public schools violated Article IX, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution
because it failed to provide a uniform system of public education and the other
lawsuit alleged an equal protection clause violation.27 Both lawsuits further alleged
that the State’s funding system violated another requirement of that same
constitutional provision because it did not provide a thorough education in that the
State had failed to provide schools with necessary resources due to lack of
funding.28 After the district court dismissed the action on both substantive and
justiciability, i.e. standing, grounds, plaintiffs appealed.29
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.30 The Court
began its Opinion by describing the sources of funding for Idaho K-12 public schools:
Public schools in Idaho are funded by a combination of local, state, and
federal funds. The State partially or totally reimburses the districts for
certain expenses (80% of costs of exceptional education personnel; 85%
of transportation costs; and 100% of teacher retirement benefits, Social
Security, and unemployment insurance). Money is also received from
the State Educational Support Program. This program is funded by state
revenues, allocated by a “support unit” formula and based on average
daily attendance in the district. Each school district's portion is reduced
by a projected “local contribution” equal to the money which would be
collected by a .36% property tax levy by the school district. Because a
school district with low assessed property value will collect less money
than a district with high property values under the .36% formula, a low
property value district contributes less money to the Educational
346, 352, n.52 (2018) [hereinafter Aligning Education Rights]. The ISEEO matter, focusing as it did on the
adequacy of K-12 school funding under the thoroughness provision of Idaho’s state constitutional
education clause, clearly falls under the third wave category.
Some scholars have suggested that a fourth wave of liability theories is beginning to emerge. See,
e.g., Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equity in Public Schools, 1 DUKE F.L.
& SOC. CHANGE 47, 58 (2008). Although these fourth wave theories focus less on funding than their
predecessors, no consensus concerning the existence or contours of a fourth wave in constitutional
school challenges to school funding systems has yet emerged. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights, supra
at 352, 354–55. For a critique of the accuracy of the wave metaphor, see William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy
Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational
Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1186–87, 1264–65 (2003).
26. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 729, 123 Idaho at 578. The consolidated lawsuit consisted of the ISEEO
case, filed on June 21, 1990, and the Frazier-Meridian case, filed on September 20, 1990. Idaho Sch. for
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 912 P.2d 644, 647, 128 Idaho 276, 279 (1996)
[hereinafter ISEEO II]; ISEEO II is discussed infra at Section II.A.3.
27. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 729, 123 Idaho at 578.
28. Id.
29. Id. Substantive challenges, of course, address the legal merits of a claim, Weisel v. Beaver
Springs Owners Ass’n, 272 P.3d 491, 497, 152 Idaho 519, 525 (2012), while justiciability challenges are
jurisdictional, i.e. go to whether a court has the power or authority to hear the matter. State v. Rhoades,
809 P.2d 455, 458, 119 Idaho 594, 597 (1991).
30. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 730, 123 Idaho at 579.
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Support Program fund than a high property value school district. The
school district may also, with voter approval, raise more money through
supplemental levies. Supplemental levies are used for both capital
construction and day-to-day maintenance and operations . . . .
[C]hartered school districts have greater authority to levy money than
do non-chartered districts. Finally, a relatively small amount of a school
district's budget comes from lottery proceeds and various federal
programs.31
The Court next turned to its legal analysis, concluding that it had resolved the
meaning of the State’s duty to provide a uniform system of public education in
Thompson.32 Specifically, the Court believed it had reached the correct result in
Thompson and, as such, “decline[d] the appellants' invitation to extend the reach
of Thompson because [it] . . . continue[d] to believe the uniformity requirement in
the education clause requires only uniformity in curriculum, not uniformity in
funding.”33 As to the state law equal protection claim, the Court held that its
resolution of the claim in Thompson constituted a holding, not dicta, and therefore
had precedential effect.34 It next held that “education is not a fundamental right
because it is not a right directly guaranteed by the state constitution” but must
occur based on legislative action under Article IX, Section 1.35 As such, the Court
held that strict scrutiny did not apply and that, with one small exception,
intermediate judicial scrutiny did not apply either.36 Applying the rational basis test
to the state law equal protection challenge, the Court “adhere[d]” to its holding in
Thompson that Idaho’s K-12 school funding system, other than its differential
treatment of chartered school districts from non-chartered school districts in
matters of local taxation, withstood constitutional scrutiny under that standard.37
The Court concluded its equal protection analysis by observing that inter-school
district funding disparities had not changed since Thompson, noting “the school
funding system is substantially the same today as it was when Thompson was
decided. If anything, the disparities which today exist between districts appear to
be less significant than at the time Thompson was decided.”38

31. Id. at 528–29, 123 Idaho at 577–78.
32. Id. at 730, 123 Idaho at 579.
33. Id. at 730-31, 123 Idaho at 579-80.
34. Id. at 731, 123 Idaho at 580.
35. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 733, 123 Idaho at 582.
36. Id. at 732–34, 123 Idaho at 581–83. The Court “concluded that the only aspect of the
funding scheme . . . which blatantly discriminates is . . . [the] statute [that] treats chartered school
districts differently than non-chartered school districts in their respective powers to levy additional taxes.
Thus, as to this small part of the appellants' equal protection challenge, the intermediate standard of
review applies.” Id. at 733–34, 123 Idaho at 582–83. The Court remanded this challenge to the district
court for resolution under the intermediate review. Id. Chartered school districts are school districts
created by the Idaho territorial legislature prior to Idaho becoming a state in 1898. See Howard v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No.1 of Nez Perce Cty., 106 P. 692, 693–94, 17 Idaho 537 (1910). Chartered school
districts should not be confused with charter schools, which are a type of public school created by the
Idaho Legislature one hundred years after Idaho attained statehood. See IDAHO CODE § 33-5201 (1998)
(Public Charter Schools Act of 1998).
37. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 734, 123 Idaho at 583.
38. Id. at 734 n.1, 123 Idaho at 583 n.1.
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Turning to the remaining substantive challenge to Idaho’s system of K-12
school funding, the Court addressed appellants’ claim that the funding system
violated the thoroughness requirement of Article IX, Section 1’s education clause.
The Court first clarified that neither it nor the district court had addressed the
requirements of the thoroughness provision in Thompson.39 The Court next
forcefully championed the importance of judicial review and, ultimately, judicial
supremacy in matters of constitutional exposition:
The respondents argue that the Court should not involve itself in the
complicated determination of what is a “thorough” education and that
we should defer to the other branches of government in this matter. . .
[W]e decline to accept the respondents' argument that the other
branches of government be allowed to interpret the constitution for us.
That would be an abject abdication of our role in the American system
of government.
Passing on the constitutionality of statutory enactments, even
enactment with political overtones, is a fundamental
responsibility of the judiciary, and has been so since Marbury v.
Madison . . . .
Likewise, we are fully confident that once we have fulfilled our
constitutional duty to interpret the constitution “the other branches of
government also will carry out their defined constitutional duties in
good faith and in a completely responsible manner.”40
Although the Court refused to abdicate its “constitutional duty to define the
meaning of the thoroughness requirement of art. 9 § 1,” it acknowledged that the
“task has been made simpler for this Court because the executive branch of the
government has already promulgated educational standards pursuant to the

39. Id. at 734, 123 Idaho at 583.
40. Id. (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power, 778 P.2d 757, 762, 116 Idaho 635, 640 (1989) and Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 88–89 (Wash. 1978)(en banc)). Although the Court did
not expressly define it as such, the issue concerning the Court’s decision to review the constitutionality
of the Legislature’s school funding enactments involves application of justiciability principles under the
political question or separation of powers doctrines. See Troutner v. Kempthorne, 128 P.3d 926, 930, 142
Idaho 389, 393 (2006) (citing Miles, 778 P.2d at 761, 116 Idaho at 639). Courts in other states have been
divided over whether K-12 school funding systems should be susceptible to state constitutional
challenges, with some courts holding that such controversies are justiciable as against political question
doctrine or separation of powers arguments or defenses, see, e.g., Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 368–74
(Colo. 2009) (en banc); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264–65 (Wyo. 1995), while other
courts have refused to reach the merits of those challenges under those same justiciability principles.
See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Coal. for Adequacy and
Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 407–08 (Fla. 1996). For commentary discussing
and decrying judicial application of the political question doctrine to avoid adjudicating school funding
cases on the merits, see Christine M. O’Neill, Comment, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court
Use of the Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM. J. L. &
SOC. PROBS. 545 (2009).
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legislature's directive in I.C. § 33–118.”41 After examining those standards, the
Court “h[e]ld that, under art. 9, § 1, the requirements for school facilities,
instructional programs and textbooks, and transportation systems as contained in
those regulations presently in effect, are consistent with our view of
thoroughness.”42 The Court concluded its analysis by reversing the district court’s
dismissal of plaintiffs’ thoroughness claim, holding that “[s]hould the plaintiffs [i.e.,
school superintendents and school districts] be able to prove that they cannot meet
the standards established by the State Board of Education, noted above, with the
money provided under the current funding system they will have presented an
apparent prima facie case that the State has not established and maintained a
system of thorough education.”43
Lastly, the Court concluded that at least some of the plaintiffs had suffered
sufficient injury based on the State’s alleged state constitutional violation to bring
the case, holding that ISEEO—the superintendents’ organization—and the school
districts had standing to sue, but that citizens and taxpayers did not.44 Having
reversed on both justiciability and substantive grounds, the Court remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.45
3. ISEEO II – More Justiciability Issues: Mootness and its Exceptions
Three years later, the ISEEO matter came before the Court again in Idaho
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education (“ISEEO
II”).46 In ISEEO II, the district court, on remand of ISEEO I, had granted summary
judgment in favor of the State defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ fourth
amended complaint on the grounds that certain enactments that had been or
would be made to Idaho’s funding and standards rendered the matter moot and,

41. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 734, 123 Idaho at 583 (citing State Board of Education Rules and
Regulations for Public School K-12, IDAPA 08.02).
42. Id. By acknowledging and adopting the IDAPA educational standards, the Court believed it
had “appropriately involve[d] the other branches of state government” in the resolution of the state
constitutional thoroughness inquiry. Id. The Court, however, expressed no opinion regarding whether
the IDAPA standards would be consistent with the definition of thoroughness if the State Board were to
amend them. Id. at 735 n.2, 123 Idaho at 584 n.2.
43. Id. at 735, 123 Idaho at 584.
44. Id. at 735–36, 123 Idaho at 584–85. Like the political question or separation of powers
doctrines, standing is a subcategory of justiciability. Young v. City of Ketchum, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159, 137
Idaho 102, 104 (2002) (citing Miles, 778 P.2d at 761, 116 Idaho at 639). Courts in other states have
likewise held that school districts have standing to bring state constitutional challenges to the adequacy
of K-12 school funding, see, e.g., Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1212 (Kan. 2014); Olson v. Guidon, 771
N.W.2d 318, 320–24 (S.D. 2009); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 80–81 (Wash.
1978) (en banc), and have reached the same conclusion regarding standing for students, parents and
education advocacy groups. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 176 A.3d 28,
43–53 (Conn. 2018). Conversely, other courts outside of Idaho have held that school districts do not have
standing to bring similar state constitutional challenges regarding alleged inadequacy in school funding,
see, e.g., E. Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), and have likewise held
that students, parents and guardians lack standing in those cases. See, e.g., Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1212–
13.
45. ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 736, 123 Idaho at 585.
46. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 912 P.2d 644, 647, 128
Idaho 276, 279 (1996) [hereinafter ISEEO II].
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therefore, non-justiciable.47 Specifically, the district court, in reaching its decision,
pointed to the following four matters:
1) The 1994 legislature appropriated $653,310,000 for public schools
which is the largest appropriation in the history of the state and which
is materially larger than appropriations in the past;
2) The legislature changed the funding formula which may
significantly impact the funding of schools;
3) The 1994 legislature enacted a definition of thoroughness which is
outside matters considered by the Supreme Court; and
4) The State Board of Education regulations in effect at the time of
the Supreme Court decision, which the Court determined were
consistent with the standard of thoroughness, will be replaced by new
standards by April 1, 1996.48
The Court, concluding that the matter was not moot, vacated the district
court’s summary judgment and remanded the matter to the lower court.49 It first
defined the mootness standard, largely focusing on whether the case—and cases
involving amendments to regulatory schemes and appropriation of funds
generally—presented a live controversy and not an abstract or hypothetical
problem.50 In turn, the Court asked whether the case “admitt[ed] of specific relief
through a decree of conclusive character” or, conversely, “the plaintiff would be
unable to obtain further relief based on the judgment.”51 Put another way, the
Court wanted to know whether the “amendment or replacement . . . otherwise
resolve[s] the parties' claims.”52 The Court then summarized the district court’s
reasoning behind its ruling and held as follows:
[T]he district court did not expressly find that the case was nonjusticiable due to the changes made by the 1994 legislature. Rather, it
appears that the court essentially determined it could not grant any
relief or resolve the controversy because it found the funding by the
legislature to be a shifting target and that the standards of
thoroughness had changed . . . .

47. Id. at 647–49, 128 Idaho at 279–81. Like political questions and standing, mootness is a
subcategory of the justiciability doctrine. Wylie v. State, Idaho Trans. Bd., 253 P.3d 700, 705, 151 Idaho
26, 31 (2011) (citing Miles, 778 P.2d at 761, 116 Idaho at 639).
48. ISEEO II, 912 P.2d at 648-49, 128 Idaho at 280–81.
49. Id. at 647, 652–53, 128 Idaho at 279, 284–85. Judge Gerald Schroeder issued the district
court decisions in ISEEO I and II. Judge Schroeder was appointed to the Idaho Supreme Court in 1995 and
retired from the Court in 2007. Gerald F. Schroeder, Ballotpedia – The Encyclopedia of American Politics,
https://ballotpedia.org/Idaho_Supreme_Court. Because of his involvement in the ISEEO matters as a
district judge, Justice Schroeder recused himself from and did not participate in the Court’s decision in
ISEEO II or any subsequent ISEEO or ISEEO-related decision issued by the Court.
50. Id. at 649–50, 128 Idaho at 281–82.
51. Id. at 650, 128 Idaho at 282.
52. Id.
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We do not agree that the actions of the 1994 legislature render this
action moot, and hold that a justiciable issue does indeed exist.
Although the legislature made the changes noted above, at the time
that the summary judgment motion was heard, there still remained in
place the Idaho constitutional requirement of a thorough education . . .
This provision has not been amended or repealed during the pendency
of this litigation. The increases in the legislature's appropriations, the
revising of the funding formulas, the adopting of the statutory
definition of “thoroughness,” and the sunsetting of the Board of
Education's regulations do not answer the question whether a
constitutionally “thorough” education is provided. Even though these
statutes and regulations may be amended or even repealed, there
remains a constitutional provision requiring that the state provide a
thorough education. Thus, we hold that all of the legislature's
enactments and changes in 1994 did not render this action moot.53
The Court went on to provide alternative grounds for allowing the case to
proceed, articulating and applying two exceptions to the mootness doctrine.54 First,
it opined that, because the State Board of Education could successively repeal
standards related to school funding each year and thereby moot each lawsuit
brought to challenge them under the thoroughness provision, plaintiffs’ claims
were excepted from the mootness doctrine because they were “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.”55 Second, it believed that the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine applied.56 Thus, the Court stated that
Even were we to determine that this controversy is technically moot
due to the sunsetting of the Board's regulations, the issue whether
current levels of state funding meet the constitutionally-mandated
requirement of “thoroughness” is a matter of great fundamental
importance. The “thoroughness” of the system of public education
affects the present and future quality of life of Idaho's citizens and its
future leaders, its children.57

53. Id. at 650–51, 128 Idaho at 282–83.
54. ISEEO II, 912 P.2d at 651–52, 128 Idaho at 283–84.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 652, 128 Idaho at 284.
57. Id. Unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies, the determination concerning
whether a state legislature has taken action sufficient to render its state constitutional obligation moot
(thereby causing dismissal of the underlying school funding case) has led to divergent results based on
the court’s assessment of the legislative action. Thus, like the Idaho Supreme Court decision in ISEEO II,
several courts (including one cited to by the Idaho high court in the second ISEEO appeal), evaluating
legislative appropriation decisions, have refused to dismiss school funding cases on mootness grounds.
See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 486 (Mo. 2009) (en banc); Coal. for Equitable
Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 118 (Or. 1991) (en banc), cited in ISEEO II, 912 P.2d at 651, 128
Idaho at 284; Knowles v. State Bd. of Educ., 547 P.2d 699, 705–06 (Kan. 1976). In contrast, several courts,
finding and concluding that the legislature had provided sufficient funding to K-12 schools (often after
years of litigation), have dismissed state constitutional challenges on mootness grounds. See, e.g., Order
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The Court concluded by holding that (1) the district court had also erred in not
allowing the plaintiffs to further amend their complaint to meet the State
defendants’ mootness challenge58 and (2) the plaintiffs were not entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees at trial or on appeal under the private attorney general
doctrine.59 The Court then remanded the matter to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with its (the high court’s) opinion.60
4. ISEEO III—Thoroughness Defined, Scope of Challenge Limited, and Third-Party
Claims Against School District Superintendents Rejected
After district court proceedings on remand, the Idaho Supreme Court again
took up plaintiffs’ K-12 school funding claims under Idaho’s constitutional
thoroughness provision in Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State
(“ISEEO III”).61 In ISEEO III, then-district court judge, Daniel Eismann, granted
summary judgment in favor of the State defendants on plaintiffs’ thoroughness
claim and denied the State defendants’ motions to file a third-party complaint
against the superintendents and their association and to dismiss certain plaintiffs
as improper parties.62 Judge Eismann reached his decision granting summary
judgment on plaintiffs’ substantive claims based on the view that, despite Article
IX, Section 1’s requirement that “[t]he Legislature . . . establish and maintain a
thorough system of public, free common schools,” the framers of the Idaho
Constitution did not intend that the Legislature provide funding for school facilities,
but rather, left that task to local school districts.63
of June 7, 2018 at 4, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012) (No. 84362-7),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/McCleary/843627PublicOrderOther06072018.pdf;
Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12 v. State, 958 A.2d 930, 932 (N.H. 2008); Order of July 20, 1998, Hull v.
Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998) (No. CV-98-0238-SA).
58. ISEEO II, 912 P.2d at 652, 128 Idaho at 284.
59. Id. at 652–53, 128 Idaho at 284–85.
60. Id. at 653, 128 Idaho at 285.
61. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913, 132 Idaho 559 (1998)
[hereinafter ISEEO III].
62. Id. at 917–18, 132 Idaho at 563–64.
63. Id. at 918–19, 132 Idaho at 564–65. Specifically, Judge Eismann reasoned and concluded as
follows:
Prior to the adoption of the Idaho Constitution, school houses were funded by the
electors of each school district voting to tax themselves . . . . The framers of the Idaho
Constitution did not seek to change that manner of funding school houses. If the people
of the State of Idaho want to change the Idaho Constitution to require the State to fund
school houses, they can do so. They can likewise elect legislators who would vote to
appropriate funds to construct or repair school houses. Absent a provision in the
Constitution requiring that result, however, it is not the province of the Court to require
the State to provide such funding.
***
This Court's conclusion, based upon the intent of the framers of our Constitution, is
that Article IX, § 1, does not require the Legislature to provide funding for school facilities.
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The Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment on plaintiffs’ thoroughness claim, but affirmed its
decisions denying the State defendants’ motion to file the third-party complaint
and to dismiss several plaintiffs.64 Reviewing the proceedings before the district
court on remand after ISEEO II, the Court first rejected the State defendants’
contention that plaintiffs had abandoned their thoroughness claim.65 The Court,
harkening back to its decision in ISEEO I and again referencing the need to both
respect the co-equal branches of state government and maintain its independence
in interpreting the state constitution, next defined Article IX, Section 1’s
thoroughness requirements.66 In working toward the definition of thoroughness,
the Court noted that the “[t]he statute defining thoroughness enacted by the
Legislature after ISEEO I provides that a thorough system of public schools is one in
which ‘[a] safe environment conducive to learning is provided’ and requires the
State Board to ‘adopt rules . . . to establish a thorough system of public schools . . .
.’”67 The Court further noted that “[t]he new rules the State Board adopted . . . state
that facilities are ‘a critical factor in carrying out educational programs’ and that
‘[t]he focus of concern in each school facility is the provision of a variety of
instructional activities and programs, with the health and safety of all persons
essential.’”68 Having summarized the post-ISEEO I legislative and executive branch
enactments, the Court then defined the state constitutional thoroughness
requirement as follows:
In the same spirit with which we accepted the prior rules as consistent
with our view of thoroughness, we conclude that the new rules
and [statute] . . . are consistent with our view of thoroughness with
respect to facilities. Even without these expressions from the
Legislature and the State Board, however, we conclude that a safe
environment conducive to learning is inherently a part of a thorough
system of public, free common schools that Article IX, § 1 of our state
constitution requires the Legislature to establish and maintain.
Certainly, the constitutional obligation of the Legislature cannot be
read to allow a system of schools that do not provide a safe
environment conducive to learning.69

It does not require the Legislature to provide such funding directly by appropriating tax
dollars, nor does it require the Legislature to provide such funds indirectly by some other
means.
Id.
64. Id. at 914, 922, 132 Idaho at 560, 568.
65. Id. at 918–19, 132 Idaho at 564–65.
66. Id. at 919–20, 132 Idaho at 565–66; see supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
67. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 919, 132 Idaho at 565.
68. Id. at 919–20, 132 Idaho at 565–66.
69. Id. at 920, 132 Idaho at 566 (emphasis added). As did the Idaho Supreme Court in ISEEO III,
courts in at least four other states–Connecticut, New Jersey, Kansas and Alabama–have interpreted
education clauses, including thoroughness provisions, in their state constitutions by reference to state
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The Court concluded that, because the State defendants had not presented
evidence attempting to eliminate genuine issues of material fact under this newly
articulated and refined thoroughness standard, the plaintiffs had no obligation to
respond with an evidentiary showing of its own and further concluded that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the State defendants
on plaintiffs’ thoroughness claim.70
The Court next addressed two other iterations of plaintiffs’ state
constitutional challenge to Idaho’s K-12 school funding system. First, the Court
rejected plaintiffs’ contention based on the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in
Roosevelt Elementary School v. Bishop,71 that Art IX, Sec. 1 of the Idaho Constitution
requires the Legislature to provide substantially equal funding for capital
expenditures to each school district.72 As to this contention, the Court noted that
that the Roosevelt decision addressed a school funding challenge under the
“general and uniform” education article of the Arizona Constitution, but that, in
interpreting Art. IX, Section 1, the Idaho high court had twice previously held that
the uniformity provision requires uniformity in curriculum, not uniformity in
funding.73 Thus, relying on precedent and the law of the case,74 the Court affirmed
the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the State defendants on
the plaintiffs’ equalized funding claim.75 Second, the Court rejected plaintiff’s
contention, based on the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Seattle School
District No. 1 v. State,76 that “to the extent that the school districts are required to
submit special override levy elections to the voters . . . in order to fund basic
maintenance and operation needs, and . . . for special facilities levies,” Article IX,

statutory enactments or administrative rules and have concluded that, among other statutorily– and
regulatorily–derived requirements, legislatures are duty bound to maintain K-12 public schools that are
safe environments conducive to learning. Connecticut Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990
A.2d 206, 212 (Conn. 2010); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 523 (N.J. 1998) (Abbott V), cited in Lonegan
v. State, 809 A.2d 91, 106 (N.J. 2002); Unified School Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1187 (Kan.
1994), cited in Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *17 (3d Jud. Dist. Dec. 2, 2003);
Alabama Coal. for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, Civ. A. Nos. CV-90-883R,CV-91-0177-R, 1993 WL 204083, at *21
(Ala. Cir. 1993), aff’d, Opinion of Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Ex
parte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002). Even though the Idaho legislature similarly defined a thorough
system of public education to include a number of factors beyond providing safe facilities, Idaho appears
to be the only state where the state high court defined constitutional thoroughness singularly and
exclusively as a safe environment conducive to learning. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 919–20, 132 Idaho at 565–
66.
70. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 919–20, 132 Idaho at 565–66.
71. 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
72. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 920, 132 Idaho at 566.
73. Id. (citing Thompson, 537 P.2d at 647, 96 Idaho at 805 and ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 740–41, 123
Idaho at 579–80).
74. The law of the case doctrine “requires that when an appellate court, in ‘deciding a case
presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement
becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the
trial court and upon subsequent appeal.‘” Berrett v. Clark County School Dist. No. 161, 454 P.3d 555, 564,
165 Idaho 913, 922 (2019) (quoting Regan v. Owen, 413 P.3d 759, 763, 163 Idaho 359, 363 (2018)).
75. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 920, 132 Idaho at 566.
76. 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
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Section 1 likewise has been violated.77 Specifically, the Court distinguished Seattle
School District No. 1, noting that, although the Washington state high court had
interpreted a “unique state constitutional provision” imposing a “paramount duty”
on the Washington legislature to educate Washington state schoolchildren, the
Idaho Constitution imposed no such duty on the Idaho legislature.78 For these
reasons, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of the State defendants on this claim.79
Rejecting a theory germane to a statutory provision previously enacted and
later amended by the Idaho Legislature to respond to the ISEEO case and future
school funding matters,80 the Court next took up the district court’s decision
denying the State defendants’ motion to file a third-party complaint against the
school district superintendents and their association who were plaintiffs in the
case.81 Under the proposed pleading, the State defendants sought to allege and
prove that, if they were liable for failing to satisfy their constitutional obligation
under the thoroughness clause, any failing was “due in whole or in part to those
superintendents' (1) discretionary decisions, (2) inefficient management, (3) failure
to recommend levies authorized by law or consolidation of districts, and (4)
administration of the districts.”82 The Court succinctly affirmed the district court’s
decision.83 Specifically, the Court held that, although Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
14(a)’s impleader provision “authorizes third-party claims against ‘a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff,’” the superintendents and
their association could not be liable to the State defendants for the plaintiffs’ (the
superintendents’ and others’) thoroughness claim, since the claim was directed at
the Legislature and its failure to provide adequate funding for K-12 public
education.84
77. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 920, 132 Idaho at 566. Plaintiffs limited their argument to the State
defendants’ failure to provide sufficient funding to school districts for maintenance and operation (“M &
O”) expenses related to facilities only, and not to school district M & O expenses generally. Id.
78. Id. at 920–21, 132 Idaho at 566–67 (citing Thompson, 96 Idaho at 805, 537 P.2d at 647
(holding that the right to public education under Article IX, § 1 is not a fundamental right)).
79. Id.
80. In 1996, the Legislature enacted the Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act (“CBECA”),
1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 845, codified at Idaho Code § 6-2201 and following. The CBECA, among other
things, allows the State to bring a parens patriae action, i.e. a suit on behalf of a school district patron,
against a school district on the grounds that the school district has failed to provide constitutionally
required educational services, Idaho Code §6-2205(2), and requires plaintiffs challenging the adequacy
of educational services to first sue their local school district before being allowed by the district court to
add the State as a defendant. Idaho Code §6-2205(3). In 2000, the Court upheld the CBECA as against
state constitutional challenges. State v. Osmunson, 17 P.3d 236, 135 Idaho 292 (2000). The Legislature
amended the CBECA in 2003 to require, among other things, dismissal of any pending school funding
lawsuits, including the ISEEO lawsuit, against state officials. IDAHO CODE § 6-2215. See infra notes 97-98,
222–226, 326 and accompanying text.
81. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d at 921, 132 Idaho at 567.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Although the Court did not rely on alternative grounds, it also could have affirmed the
district court’s decision because, under the express language of Rule 14(a), the superintendent plaintiffs
could not be impleaded because they were already parties to the action. See Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424
F.2d 52, 56 (3rd Cir. 1970) (holding that third-party pleading practice is not permissible against plaintiff,
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Resolving the remaining issue before it, the Court concluded by affirming the
district court’s decision refusing to dismiss certain plaintiffs—school children whose
school districts had not been named as plaintiffs—as improper parties.85 Here, the
State defendants argued that, because the unnamed school districts could be liable
to those students for failing to provide a thorough education, those school districts
were indispensable parties to the ISEEO lawsuit and, as such, plaintiffs in those
school districts could not proceed without their (the unnamed school district’s)
joinder.86 The Court, however, quickly dispatched the State defendants’ argument,
noting that an unnamed defendant’s “indispensability” is determined by whether
the relief sought against them and further that, as discussed previously,87 plaintiffs
had not sought to recover against any school district (or superintendent) on their
thoroughness claim.88
The Court then returned the matter to the district court, ordering it to conduct
further proceedings as follows:
On remand, the trial court shall conduct a trial or other appropriate
proceeding to determine whether the Legislature has provided a means
to fund facilities that provide a safe environment that is conducive to
learning. When the trial court has done so, it shall make its decision
granting or denying relief. We do not express any opinion at this time
about the appropriate relief that should be granted if the trial court
decides that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief.89

because they are already “a party to the action” under essentially identical Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
14(a)); Cobb v. Nye, No. 4:14-cv-0865, 2015 WL 3702515, *2 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (same); see also WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1446 n. 27 (3d Ed. August 2019 Update) and cases cited therein.
85. 976 P.2d at 921, 132 Idaho at 567.
86. Id. at 922, 132 Idaho at 568.
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 922, 132 Idaho at 568.
89. Id. By Order, issued in mid-May 1999, the Court declined to rehear the matter. Id. Less than
a month later, Judge Eismann, having received the mandate of the Court, accused the Court of “amending
the Idaho Constitution under the guise of construing it” and placing itself “above the law” by allowing
the case to proceed. Order of Disqualification, Case No. 94008, filed June 9, 1999 at 2. In Judge Eismann’s
view, his “oath of office was intended to be . . . a guarantee of integrity” and “to implement the decision
of the Idaho Supreme Court in this case would require that [he] violate [his] oath of office.” Id. at 3. As
such, he recused himself from acting further in the case. Id. After discussing Judge Eismann’s decision to
recuse himself, one scholar cogently pointed out that “[i]n general, of course, a trial court judge is bound
by the legal rulings of a superior appellate court. It is extremely rare for a trial judge to refuse to hear a
case based on his view that the appellate court made an erroneous legal ruling. If many judges acted so
willfully, the administration of justice would be seriously undermined.” John D. Echeverria, Changing the
Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 217,
242 (2001). Indeed, a Comment to the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a]though there are
times when disqualification is necessary to protect the rights of litigants and preserve public confidence
in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must be available to decide
matters that come before the courts and further that “[u]nwarranted disqualification may bring public
disfavor to the court and to the judge personally.” Comment to Canon 2, Rule 2.7. The Comment
concludes that unwarranted disqualification may negatively impact several important considerations,
including “[t]he dignity of the court, the judge’s respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper
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5. ISEEO IV—The Legislature Strikes Back Unconstitutionally, as well as Initial
Legislative Discontent about Judge Bail, the Special Master and the Remedial
Phase of the Case
Plaintiffs’ school funding challenge next came before the Court in Idaho
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State (“ISEEO IV”).90 After remand in
ISEEO III, Judge Deborah Bail, the district judge assigned to the case after Judge
Eismann recused himself, conducted a court trial on the thoroughness issue.91 After
trial, “the district court concluded that the system of school funding established by
the Legislature was insufficient to meet the constitutional requirement because
reliance on local property taxes alone to pay for major repairs or the replacement
of unsafe school buildings was inadequate for those districts with a low property
tax base or low per capita income.”92 The State defendants appealed that
judgment.93 Initially, the district court did not take any remedial measures so that
the Legislature would have time to respond to its findings.94 However, when the
district court concluded that the Legislature had not taken appropriate action, the
court “began implementing its remedial measures, including a phase of information
gathering and the appointment of a special master.”95
During the 2003 Legislative session and while the State defendants’ appeal
was pending, the Legislature enacted House Bill 403,96 which was an amendment
to the Constitutionally Based Education Claims Act (“CBECA”).97 The Court
summarized HB 403’s provisions as follows:
HB 403 . . . established among other requirements, that the plaintiffs
and the State sue school districts where unsafe school buildings exist;
concern for the burdens that may be imposed upon the judge’s colleagues . . . . ” Id. Given the abovenoted concerns and Judge Eismann’s role as trial judge in the case, it is fair to say that Judge Eismann, by
disqualifying himself, placed himself above the law and acted with less than appropriate judicial integrity.
A far better example of judicial integrity under similar circumstances occurred with Judge William
Sweigert’s handling of two Viet Nam War-era cases. In Mottola v. Nixon, Judge Sweigert allowed several
military reservists to challenge the constitutionality of the war in Viet Nam, rejecting several justiciability
challenges by the government. 318 F. Supp. 538, 545–54 (N.D. Cal. 1970). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
disagreed, concluding that Judge Sweigert had erred in holding that the reservists had standing to sue
and “reversed, with directions to dismiss the amended complaint.” Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178, 184
(9th Cir. 1972). On remand, Judge Sweigert expressed his disagreement, albeit in dicta, with the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling, complied with the mandate and holding of the appellate court, and dismissed both the
Mottola case and a similar case pending before him. See Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404, 404–07 (N. D.
Cal. 1972).
Judge Eismann was elected to the Idaho Supreme Court in 2000 and retired from the Court in
2017.
Daniel
Eismann,
Ballotpedia
–
The
Encyclopedia
of
American
Politics,
https://ballotpedia.org/Daniel_Eismann. Because of his prior involvement with the ISEEO matter as a
district judge, Justice Eismann recused himself from, and did not participate in, the ISEEO matter or
ISEEO-related matters during his time on the Court.
90. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 97 P.3d 453, 140 Idaho 586 (2004)
[hereinafter ISEEO IV].
91. Id. at 456, 140 Idaho at 589.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 455, 140 Idaho at 588.
94. Id. at 456, 140 Idaho at 589.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 80 and infra note 227.
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that venue for these suits would be changed to the judicial districts in
which the defendant school districts lie; that the parties of the current
case would be dismissed if they did not follow the procedures of
HB 403; and that state district courts could impose an educational
necessity levy to repair or replace unsafe school buildings.98
In mid-June 2003, the Court ordered the district court to resolve all motions
regarding HB 403’s constitutionality.99 The district court rendered its decision in
late-October 2003, declaring HB 403 unconstitutional in all respects.100 The Court
then heard the State defendants’ appeal concerning that issue.101
The Court essentially affirmed the district court’s decision. In so holding, the
Court rejected the State defendants’ argument, based on HB 403, that the school
district plaintiffs no longer had standing to pursue its thoroughness claim against
the State defendants.102 The Court further held that HB 403 was unconstitutional
for three reasons: first, because it was a special law directed at a particular case,
i.e. the ISEEO matter; second, because it impermissibly altered the rules of civil
procedure in violation of the Court’s rulemaking authority; and, third, because its
levy/taxation provisions violated the separation of powers doctrine.103
As to the standing issue, the Court, relying on and refusing to revisit its holding
in ISEEO I,104 succinctly held that the State defendants’ argument was without
merit.105 Thus, the Court stated that
The State maintains that the school districts represented in ISEEO have
no standing to bring suit against the State because HB 403 has
abolished their right to sue the State without first following the
procedures set forth in HB 403.
***
The State made similar arguments in ISEEO I as it does now, arguing
that a school district cannot sue its creator. However, this Court upheld
the school districts' right to seek relief when they allege they are being
deprived of funds they are entitled to, and that right cannot be
legislatively withdrawn when it is based not only on a statutory grant of

98. 97 P.3d at 589–90, 140 Idaho at 456–57.
99. Id. at 457, 140 Idaho at 590.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 590–91, 140 Idaho at 457–58.
103. Id. at 591–97, 140 Idaho at 458–64. In a subsequent non-ISEEO matter involving a state
constitutional challenge to certain fees imposed by school districts and attempting to revive the school
funding challenges, the Court made clear that “ISEEO IV did not address whether the CBECA, as a whole,
was unconstitutional; rather, the case addressed whether HB 403 was unconstitutional.” Joki v. State,
394 P.3d 48, 53, 162 Idaho 5 (2017); see infra notes 220–227 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
105. ISSEO IV, 97 P.3d at 591, 140 Idaho at 458.
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standing [under Idaho Code § 33-301] but a constitutional mandate
over the Legislature as well to fulfill this very duty.106
Turning to plaintiffs’ contention that HB 403 constituted an unenforceable
special law, the Court first quoted Article III, § 19 of the Idaho Constitution, which
provides that “[t]he legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the
following enumerated cases, that is to say: . . . [r]egulating the practice of the courts
of justice.”107 The Court then reiterated its standards for determining whether a law
was an unenforceable special law or an enforceable general law, stating that “[a]
special law applies only to an individual or number of individuals out of a single class
similarly situated and affected or to a special locality. . . . A statute is general and
not special if its . . . provisions operate upon all persons and subject matters in like
situations”108 and further that “[t]he test for determining whether a law is local or
special is whether the classification is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.”109 Applying the first part of the standard to HB 403’s legislative
findings and substantive statutory provisions, the Court held as follows:
[I]t is very clear that, though the State asserts on appeal the Legislature
intended to create a general law applicable to a wide class of parties,
the Legislature was in reality enacting special legislation directed
specifically at the ISEEO case and particularly, the Plaintiffs and their
cause of action against the Legislature. Though the State argues that HB
403 applies to all school districts equally, the language of the bill plainly
states that it is meant to specifically apply to the current litigation. HB
403 is aimed at essentially disbanding the ISEEO case and restructuring
it in a manner that destroys the Plaintiffs' cause of action against the
Legislature. This is a special enactment designed only to affect one
particular lawsuit and is clearly a special law in violation of Article III, §
19.110
The Court next addressed the plaintiffs’ contention that HB 403, by requiring
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action against the Legislature, violated the state
constitution by altering the rules of civil procedure and thereby undermining the
Court’s rulemaking authority.111 Referencing Article V, Section 13, the Court has
repeatedly recognized that it has the inherent power to formulate rules of practice
and procedure for Idaho courts.112 That constitutional provision makes limited
inroads into the Court’s inherent rulemaking power, stating that
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting IDAHO CONST., art. III, § 19).
108. ISSEO IV, 97 P.3d at 591, 140 Idaho at 458 (quoting Sch. Dist. No. 25, Bannock Cty. v. State
Tax Comm’n, 612 P.2d 126, 134, 101 Idaho 283, 291, (1980)).
109. Id. (quoting Concerned Taxpayers of Kootenai Cty. v. Kootenai Cty., 50 P.3d 991, 994, 137
Idaho 496, 499 (2002)).
110. ISSEO IV, 97 P.3d at 592, 140 Idaho at 459.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Talbot v. Ames Constr., 904 P.2d 560, 563, 127 Idaho 648, 651 (1995); State v.
Badger, 525 P.2d 363, 365, 96 Idaho 169, 170 (1974); R.E.W. Construction Co. v. District Court of Third
Jud. Dist., 400 P.2d 390, 397, 88 Idaho 426, 437–38 (1965). The Legislature “recognized and confirmed”
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The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department
of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate
department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a
proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the
methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts
below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without
conflict with this Constitution.113
Recognizing that the Legislature had made findings that HB 403’s procedural
and dismissal provisions were necessary,114 the Court then framed the question as
whether the Legislature could solely determine whether “a law altering procedural
rules is necessary.”115 The Court answered the question “no,” holding that
“’[w]hether legislative action in this context is necessary within the meaning
of Article V, Section 13 is a constitutional determination to be passed upon by this
Court.’”116
In making the “when necessary” determination, the Court pointed out that
both I.R.C.P. 41 regarding involuntary dismissal of law suits and I.R.C.P. 62 regarding
the stay of proceedings in pending actions require court approval.117 In contrast, HB
403 amended Idaho Code Sections 6–2215(3) and 6-2215(2), respectively, to
establish dismissal and stay provisions for constitutionally based educational claims
as follows:
School districts that were parties to a lawsuit that presented
constitutionally based educational claims or counterclaims . . . that are
not defendants in any complaint filed pursuant to subsection (2) of this
section shall no longer be parties and shall be dismissed from any
proceedings that were suspended. Any defendant to a lawsuit that
presented constitutionally based educational claims or counterclaims
on the effective date of this section and who is not a defendant
authorized by this chapter shall be dismissed from any proceeding that
was suspended.

the Supreme Court’s “inherent power . . . to make rules governing procedure in all the courts of Idaho”
by enacting Idaho Code § 1-212. Cather v. Kelso, 652 P.2d 188, 192, 103 Idaho 684, 688 (1982).
113. IDAHO CONST., art. V, § 13 (emphasis added).
114. H.R. 403, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2003). HB 403 contained legislative findings,
stating, among other things, that “[t]he Legislature . . . determines it can best exercise its constitutional
duty to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools
by altering the procedure of the existing lawsuit to bring it under the Constitutionally Based Educational
Claims Act . . . .” Id. (quoted in ISEEO IV, 97 P.3d at 592, 140 Idaho at 459).
115. ISSEO IV, 97 P.3d at 593, 140 Idaho at 460.
116. Id. (quoting In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 912 P.2d 614, 622, 128 Idaho 246, 254 (1995)).
117. ISSEO IV, 97 P.3d at 592–93, 140 Idaho at 459–60. Specifically, Rule 41(b)(1)’s involuntary
dismissal provision provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a
court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” IDAHO R. CIV. P. 41(b)(1).
Similarly, although Rule 62 largely focuses on stays of proceedings involving enforcement of judgments,
the Court has made clear that a stay of proceedings generally “is a matter vested in the sound discretion
of the trial court.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Brady, 907 P.2d 807, 811, 127 Idaho 830, 834 (1995).
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[and]
If this chapter applies to a lawsuit pending on the effective date of this
amendment to this section, all proceedings in the lawsuit shall be
suspended for fifty-six (56) days from the effective date of this
amendment to this section.118
As to the above-quoted dismissal provision, the Court opined that “[t]his
portion of the legislation directly contradicts Idaho court procedure and effectively
dismisses parties to a pending lawsuit without any court action.”119 Moreover, as to
the stay provision, the Court believed that “[a]gain, the Legislature purports to
make decisions regarding . . . [the ISEEO] litigation that only the district court can
make.”120 The Court then concluded as follows:
That the Legislature is attempting to invoke its powers as a branch of
government to direct the outcome of a case in which it is the defendant
cannot entirely be attributed to the rationale that it is merely seeking
to effectuate the best outcome for all involved or that its decision is
entirely policy oriented. … However, contrary to the arguments of the
State, this lawsuit was not brought to seek action from the plaintiffs or
the courts, but rather, from the Legislature to fulfill a constitutionally
mandated duty. The State is attempting to end legislatively
the ISEEO suit and effectively remove itself from any further
responsibility or liability. Such a motive may be a necessity as viewed by
the Legislature but, given the claims made by the school districts, it is
not sufficiently necessary so as to justify rewriting the Court's rules of
procedure. . . . Consequently, we find that there is no necessity present
pursuant to Article V, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution meriting the
legislature's attempt to legislate itself out of this lawsuit121 by rewriting
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.122

118. HB 403.
119. ISSEO IV, 97 P.3d at 593, 140 Idaho at 460.
120. Id.
121. At least two other state legislatures have attempted to legislate themselves out of a K-12
school funding lawsuit by taking actions other than meeting its school funding obligation under a state
constitution. The Kansas legislature, among other things, proposed (but ultimately did not adopt)
legislation that would have deprived Kansas courts of jurisdiction over school funding claims. Derek W.
Black, Educational Gerrymandering: Money, Motives, and Constitutional Rights, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1385,
1414 & n.142 (2019); Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1093 & n.350 (2006). Similarly, after the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs at the outset of the DeRolph school funding litigation, the Ohio
legislature threatened to, but did not ultimately, enact legislation that would have stripped Ohio courts
of jurisdiction in school funding matters. Larry L. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to an
Adequate Education, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 83, 112 (2005) [hereinafter Ohio’s Long Road]; Barry
Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 153 (2013).
122. ISSEO IV, 97 P.3d at 593, 140 Idaho at 460 (emphasis added). The Court stated that “[s]uch
a law is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable” at the conclusion of its discussion of plaintiffs’ “when
necessary” challenge. Id. Given the Court’s articulation of those terms as part of the test for determining
whether a legislative enactment constitutes an unenforceable special law, the Court’s use of those terms
at this juncture appears misplaced.
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The Court next took up the issue of whether HB 403’s provision allowing the
district court to impose an educational necessity levy on school districts violated
the separation of powers provision of the Idaho Constitution.
HB 403 amended Idaho Code § 6-2214 to provide for educational necessity
levies and describe the circumstances under which district courts may order their
imposition:
[T]he district court may impose an educational necessity levy for the
purpose of raising revenues to abate unsafe or unhealthy conditions
that have been identified by findings of fact or a judgment of the district
court, by a consent agreement that has been accepted (with or without
modification) by the district court or by a local school district plan to
abate unsafe or unhealthy conditions that has been accepted (with or
without modification) by the district court. The district court shall
impose an educational necessity levy if it finds that the school district
has no alternative source of revenue to use to abate unsafe or
unhealthy conditions that have been identified . . . .123
In turn, Article II, §1 of the Idaho Constitution sets forth limitations on
the power of each branch of government, providing that
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.124
The Court then reiterated basic separation of power principles, stating
that “[j]ust as Article II of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the Legislature from
usurping powers properly belonging to the judicial department, so does that
provision prohibit the judiciary from improperly invading the province of the
Legislature”125 and, specifically, that “[t]he power to tax, or to exempt from
taxation, remains with the Legislature.”126
Applying these principles and distinguishing Idaho and federal case law cited
by the State defendants, the Court rejected the State defendants’ argument that
HB 403’s educational necessity levy provision did not violate Idaho’s separation of
power limitations because “district courts would merely be implementing a tax
created and authorized by the Legislature.”127 Rather, the Court characterized HB
403 and held as follows:
123.
124.
125.
at 255).
126.
127.

ISEEO IV, 97 P.3d at 461, 140 Idaho at 594.
IDAHO CONST. art. II § 1.
Id. at 464, 140 Idaho at 597 (quoting In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 912 P.2d at 623, 128 Idaho
Id. (quoting Williams v. Baldridge, 284 P. 203, 207, 48 Idaho 618, 630 (1930)).
ISEEO IV, 97 P.3d at 461–64, 140 Idaho at 594–97.
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HB 403 . . . creates a legislative process in which taxing authority is given
directly to a separate branch of government—the judiciary—whose
powers and purposes were not meant to involve the taxation of Idaho
citizens. It is one thing for the courts to direct a governmental entity to
carry out its legislatively assigned duty to tax; it is quite another for the
court itself to impose the tax. Though the State is effectively seeking to
get rid of the middleman in this transaction by giving the courts the
power up front to fix the problem, in doing so it ignores foundational
principles of separation of powers.
...
Because I.C. § 6–2214 as amended by HB 403 assigns the power to tax
to the judiciary, it violates the Idaho Constitution.128
Near the conclusion of its opinion in ISEEO IV, the Court addressed an issue
concerning the remedial phase of the case – Judge Bail’s appointment of a special
master.129 After her liability determination, Judge Bail eventually appointed a
special master to investigate the condition of certain K-12 school buildings in Idaho
and required the State to pay the special master’s fees.130 The State defendants
challenged Judge Bail’s order and, specifically, sought to disqualify her from sitting
as a judge in the case because she had become a party or material witness by filing
a response to the challenge.131 The Court disagreed with the State defendants’
argument, tersely concluding that “[t]he district judge's impartiality in this case has
not been credibly brought into question by her justified response to the State's
petition and there is no basis for finding that she cannot continue to sit on this
case.”132
6. ISEEO V – Lack of Thoroughness Proven and Affirmed, but the Court Retains
Jurisdiction Over the Remedial Phase of the Case and Suggests Remedial
Measures to the Legislature
After addressing four previous appeals in the ISEEO matter, the Court took up
the district court’s determination that the State defendants violated the
thoroughness provision of Article IX, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution in Idaho
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State (ISEEO V).133 The Court first noted
that on remand from ISEEO III, “the district court was directed to determine the
narrow issue of whether the Legislature had provided a means to fund facilities that
provide a safe environment conducive to learning, pursuant to the thoroughness
128. Id. at 464, 140 Idaho at 597.
129. Id.
130. Id. The issue concerning Judge Bail’s ordering the State to pay the special master’s costs
during the pendency of the litigation came before the Court several years later in State v. District Court
of Fourth Judicial District, 152 P.3d 566, 143 Idaho 695 (2007) (“ISEEO VI”); see infra notes 181–193 and
accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 129 P.3d 1199, 142 Idaho 450 (2005)
[hereinafter ISEEO V].
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requirement of Article IX, § 1.”134 The Court then summarized the post-ISEEO III
proceedings before the district court:
The district court held a court trial in 2000, and in 2001 entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (2001 Findings). The district
court concluded the system of school funding established by the
Legislature was insufficient to meet the constitutional requirement
because reliance on loans alone to pay for major repairs or the
replacement of unsafe school buildings was inadequate for the poorer
school districts. The district court deferred any remedial action to allow
the Legislature time to address the court's findings. However, in late
2002 when the Legislature, in the district court's opinion, had failed to
take appropriate action, the district court began implementing its
remedial measures, including a phase of information gathering and the
appointment of a Special Master.135
The Court followed by framing the issue before it and its conclusion in favor
of plaintiffs on that issue, stating as follows:
[T]his appeal finally addresses the district court's 2001 Findings and the
court's final determination that the current state “system based upon
loans alone is not adequate to meet the constitutional mandate to
establish and maintain a general, uniform, and thorough system of
public, free common schools in a ‘safe environment conducive to
learning’ for Idaho's poorest school districts.” We agree with this
conclusion.136
The Court began its analysis by noting what it would not be deciding, i.e. issues
“concern[ing] the remedial phase of the litigation” because issues relating to the
special master were “raised in another appeal pending before this Court.”137
Surprisingly, given this disclaimer, the Court then turned to issues intertwined, at
least in part, with the remedial phase of the case: the scope of the evidence
plaintiffs could properly present concerning the safety of school facilities and the
scope of any resulting judgment.138 As to those issues, the Court held that
[T]he focus of this litigation is on the adequacy of the Legislature's
mechanism for funding public school districts; a judgment that such a
funding mechanism is unconstitutional will necessarily affect all school
districts throughout the state, regardless of whether those districts
134. Id. at 1202–03, 142 Idaho at 453–54; see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 1203, 142 Idaho at 454.
136. Id. The Court also noted that, after the district court’s liability determination and
appointment of a special master, the Legislature enacted HB 403, which restricted and altered various
procedures concerning K-12 school funding lawsuits, including the ISEEO matter, but that the Court had
held HB 403 unconstitutional in ISEEO IV. Id.; see supra notes 90–128 and accompanying text.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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presented evidence at trial, previously settled, or were never even
parties to this lawsuit. ISEEO, though not technically representing
certain school districts, is entitled to show statewide safety problems
caused by the Legislature's current methods and levels of funding.139
The Court next addressed the State defendants’ contention that the district
court had improperly turned the definition of the thoroughness standard from a
question of law into a question of fact and, in so doing, had expanded the definition
beyond the meaning previously established by the Court.140 The Court made clear
that, having fulfilled its constitutional duty to define a thorough system of
education in ISEEO I, the definition is a question of law.141 The Court then held that
the district court, by analyzing the adequacy of state standards relating to
educational coursework and programs, went beyond the administrative standards
concerning safe buildings and facilities previously adopted by the Court and acted
improperly by considering irrelevant matters.142 As such, the Court “decline[d] to
analyze thoroughness as it relates to course work and programming” on the State
defendants’ appeal.143
The Court then turned to an analysis of the adequacy of the evidence that the
district court used to support its findings, which were both specific as to structural
problems and fire hazards in specific school districts and more generalized
concerning Idaho schools—particularly those in rural areas.144 The Court rejected
the State defendants’ argument that the Court’s mandate in ISEEO III required the
district court to limit itself to making specific findings concerning the safety of
particular facilities in specific school districts and did not permit generalized
findings.145 Thus, the Court held as follows:
In making this argument, the State attempts to refocus this litigation
into small, district-by-district battles instead of addressing the larger,
overall issue of the Legislature's constitutional duty towards public
education in Idaho. The State has mischaracterized this Court's order
on remand, which was to determine whether the Legislature has
provided a means to fund facilities that provide a safe environment
conducive to learning, not whether each Plaintiff school district's
139. Id. at 1203–04, 142 Idaho at 454–55.
140. Id. at 1204, 142 Idaho at 455.
141. Id. (citing ISEEO I, 850 P.2d 724, 734, 123 Idaho 573, 583 (1993)).
142. Id. at 1204, 142 Idaho at 455.
143. Id. The district court’s analysis of the adequacy of course work and programs vis-à-vis the
thoroughness requirement was not entirely misplaced. To be sure, the administrative rules adopted by
the Court as to the thoroughness standard focused primarily on the need for building safety and its effect
on student learning. ISEEO III, 976 P.2d 913, 919, 132 Idaho 559, 565 (1999); see supra notes 61–63 and
accompanying text. However, the Court noted in ISEEO III that those same rules provided that “‘[t]he
focus of concern in each school facility is the provision of a variety of instructional activities and programs
. . . ,’” Id. at 919–20, 132 Idaho at 565–66 (emphasis added); see supra note 68 and accompanying text,
and further that uniformity in curriculum, not funding, was required. Id. at 918–19, 132 Idaho at 564–65
(emphasis added); see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
144. ISEEO V, 129 P. 3d at 1204, 142 Idaho at 455. For example, the district court made a
generalized finding that “Idaho's schools, particularly those in rural areas, are stretched to the breaking
point in meeting the educational needs of their charges.” Id.
145. Id. at 1204, 142 Idaho at 455.
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facilities were adequate to provide a safe environment. In short, the
State fails to grasp the relevance of the adage “the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts.” Since the issue is systemic in nature and the
admitted evidence so voluminous, the district court did not commit any
error in making some generalized findings about facility problems, after
pointing out some specific and illustrative examples.146
The Court next discussed the adequacy of the district court’s specific
findings.147 Again pointing to the forest of evidence, rather than the individual trees,
presented to the district court concerning the thoroughness issue, the Court first
stated that
While the State quibbles with some of the evidence used to support the
2001 Findings the State has failed to show how the disputed findings
were material to the overall conclusion the Legislature has failed in its
constitutional duty to provide a thorough public education system. The
record in this case involves a transcript of more than 3,500 pages,
thousands of pages of pre-filed testimony and thousands of pages of
exhibits. The record also includes uncontradicted testimony from
numerous school administrators and superintendents outlining facility
problems and the barriers to correcting them. The State's pedantic
focus on [certain] . . . details . . . distracts from the overwhelming
evidence in the record documenting serious facility and funding
problems in the state's public education system.148
In particular, the Court pointed to the damning nature of the State’s own
reports concerning the condition of school facilities:
Among such evidence is the State of Idaho's own 1993 Statewide School
Facilities Needs Assessment, which documented facility deficiencies
and concluded fifty-seven percent of all Idaho school buildings had
“serious” safety concerns. A 1999 update to that report noted fiftythree of the buildings needing serious and immediate attention in 1993
had deteriorated even further.149
The Court moved next to the evidence concerning structural and safety
problems at specific Idaho schools and the problems encountered by school
districts in funding school improvements.150 The Court pointed to three schools—
Wendell Middle School, American Falls High School and Troy Junior Senior High
School—noting in each instance that the buildings suffered from structural
problems due to lack of funding for repairs that rendered them unfit for
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1204–05, 142 Idaho at 455–56.
ISEEO V, 123 P.3d at 1205, 142 Idaho at 456.
Id.
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occupancy.151 The Court then turned to two, related funding problems identified by
the district court as undermining a number of school districts’ ability to provide safe
school buildings. First, the Court approvingly quoted the district court’s conclusion
that the “glaring gap” in the funding system was the “lack of any mechanism to deal
quickly with major, costly, potentially catastrophic conditions by districts which are
low in population, have a low tax base and are in economically depressed areas.”152
Second, the Court agreed with the district court about the difficulties school
districts face in passing supplemental bonds and levies under the supermajority
electoral requirement,153 illustrating the difficulty by describing one school
district’s—Jerome School District’s—repeated, narrow losses at the polls when the
funds sought were crucial to providing a thorough education for its
schoolchildren.154
The Court concluded its analysis by affirming the district court’s conclusion
concerning the State defendants’ failure to satisfy the Legislature’s thoroughness
obligation under the Idaho Constitution:
The list of safety concerns and difficulties in getting funds for repairs or
replacements is distressingly long; the overwhelming evidence not only
supports, but compels the district court's conclusion of law: the funding
system in effect in 2001 was simply inadequate to meet the
constitutional mandate to provide a thorough system of education in a
safe environment. Thus, to the extent there are any inaccuracies in the
2001 Findings, they are very minor and not clearly erroneous in light of
the extensive evidence in the record supporting the district court's
conclusion.155
The Court next addressed the State defendants’ contention that the enacted
legislation and funding provided to school districts after the district court trial in
2000 rendered the matter moot.156 The Court spoke favorably about the
Legislature’s funding efforts—a topic that would have significance later in the
case—noting
the significant strides the Legislature has made in providing additional
funds to Idaho schools for building replacement and repair. The
Legislature amended the School Safety and Health Revolving Loan
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution provides that “[n]o . . . school district . . . shall incur
any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and
revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof
voting at an election to be held for that purpose . . . .” Likewise, prior to 1987, Idaho Code § 33-804
required at least two-thirds of the electors voting in a school district election to vote in favor of a school
facilities levy and the concomitant bonded indebtedness to approve additional local funding to repair or
construct school facilities. After 1987, § 33-804’s supermajority voting requirement remained, with the
two-thirds vote requirement remaining for larger projects and lesser percentage amounts, albeit sixty
percent (60%) and fifty-five percent (55%), being required for smaller valued facilities projects.
154. ISEEO V, 123 P.3d at 1205, 142 Idaho at 456.
155. Id. at 1205–06, 142 Idaho at 456–57.
156. Id. at 1206–07, 142 Idaho at 457–58. The State defendants had previously made a mootness
argument in ISEEO II. See supra notes 46–60 and accompanying text.
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Fund, created in 2000, to a Loan and Grant Fund in 2001. . . . The fund
provided $10 million to seven school districts enabling them to finance
some facility repair or replacement. Indeed, several of those districts
were addressed in the district court's 2001 Findings. The Legislature
took another major step forward by enacting the Idaho Uniform Public
School Building Safety Act . . . which allows for the creation of uniform
safety standards and requirements for the inspection of the structural
integrity of Idaho's existing school buildings. Also, the Legislature has
increased the time to pay for a plant facilities levy from ten to twenty
years, reducing the annual payments and possibly making such levies a
more attractive option for voters. . . . The Legislature is to be
commended for taking these steps towards providing a safe
environment conducive to learning.157
The Court, however, did not believe the subsequent legislation had rendered
the case moot.158 Indeed, the Court suggested that funding to school districts from
other non-state legislative sources, including federal forest funds, had helped to
alleviate unsafe building conditions.159 Further, the Legislature’s Loan and Grant
program funding had not necessarily satisfied constitutional thoroughness
requirements and had expired with no guarantee that additional funds would be
forthcoming.160 The Court felt that “there is little to show that the present system
of funding is adequate to stop the further accumulation of dangerous or inadequate
buildings.”161 Thus, the Court concluded that “the evidence in the record clearly
supports the district court's 2001 Findings. We affirm the conclusion of the district
court that the current funding system is simply not sufficient to carry out the
Legislature's duty under the constitution.”162
157. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1206, 142 Idaho at 457.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1206–07, 142 Idaho at 457–58. As it did in ISEEO II, the Court also held that, because
“the issue of whether the State has met its constitutional mandate to provide a safe environment
conducive to learning . . . is . . . a matter of great public importance[,]” it could also resolve the issue
under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 1207, 142 Idaho at 458.
162. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1208, 142 Idaho at 459; see also id. at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460 (“We
affirm the district court's conclusion that the current method of funding as it relates to school facilities
is unconstitutional. . . .”). In so holding, the Court agreed with the Ohio Supreme Court’s sentiment –
expressed concerning Ohio’s constitutional thoroughness provision – that “[t]he valuation of local
property has no connection whatsoever to the actual education needs of the locality, with the result that
a system overreliant on local property taxes is by its very nature an arbitrary system that can never be
totally thorough.” Id. at 1208 n.2, 142 Idaho at 459 n.2 (quoting DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 999
(Ohio 2000)).
By affirming the trial court’s decision that Idaho’s system for funding K-12 public school’s
violated state constitutional thoroughness requirements, the Idaho Supreme Court joined a solid
majority of courts nationally that had sided with plaintiffs in school funding cases over the years. See
Robert A. Shapiro, States of Inequality: Fiscal Federalism, Unequal States, and Unequal People, 108 CAL.
L. REV. 1531, 1557 (2020) (citing MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS & KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THROUGH
STATE
COURTS 8-9
(Supp.
2017),
http://schoolfunding.info/wp-
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The Court next discussed the remedial phase of the litigation.163 At the outset
of its discussion, the Court declined to address remedial issues on the pending
appeal, but instead decided to retain jurisdiction and thereby take the remedial
phase of the case from the district court:
Any issues relating to the second, or “remedy,” phase of the litigation
are not part of this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we believe it
more appropriate at this point for the case to remain before this Court.
Thus, any remedy phase before the trial court is unnecessary and,
likewise, we need not address, in this appeal, any issues which arose
during that part of the litigation below.164
The Court—consistent with its previous decisions in ISEEO I and ISEEO III
allowing the Legislature to play a significant role in setting the constitutional
thoroughness standard, albeit subject to judicial review for constitutionality—
explained as follows:
While the Legislature has made laudable efforts to address the safety
concerns of various school districts, the task is not yet complete. The
appropriate remedy, however, must be fashioned by the Legislature
and not this Court. Quite simply, Article IX of our constitution means
what it says: “[I]t shall be the duty of the Legislature of Idaho, to
establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of
public, free common schools.” Thus, it is the duty of the State, and not
this Court or the local school districts, to meet this constitutional
mandate.
We are mindful of our duty to determine whether the current funding
system passes constitutional muster, and we likewise respect the duties
of the Legislature, as a separate branch of government, to make policy
and funding decisions. It is not our intent to substitute our judgment on
how to establish criteria for safe buildings or create a proper funding
system for that of the Legislature.165

content/uploads/2017/07/COURTS-AND-KIDS-2017-Supplement.-07.12.17-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BXP-HAVU]); see also Molly A. Hunter & Kathleen J. Gebhardt, Legal Precedent and
the Opportunity for Educational Equity: Where Now, Colorado? 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 894 (2016) (citing
Litigation in the States, EDUC. L. CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/cases/litigation-in-the-states.html.
Specifically, although scholars disagree on the precise numbers, empirical studies have shown that,
between 1989 and 2016 or 2017, plaintiffs had an overall success rate of anywhere from fifty-eight
percent to sixty-seven percent in cases alleging that state public school funding systems violated state
constitutional provisions. Shapiro, Id.; Hunter & Gebhardt, Id.
163. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1207–08, 142 Idaho at 459–60. Before addressing remedial issues, the
Court discussed two subsidiary issues – the district court’s orders admitting into evidence a number of
post-trial affidavits offered by the plaintiffs and awarding plaintiff’s costs from the State for expenditures
made on lead testing in Idaho’s Silver Valley. Id. at 1208–09, 142 Idaho at 458–59. The Court affirmed the
district court’s decision concerning the evidentiary issue, but reversed its decision on the costs issue. Id.
164. Id. at 1208, 142 Idaho at 459.
165. Id.; see supra notes 25–45, 61–89 and accompanying text.
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Again stressing that the Court did not intend to “direct . . . the Legislature on
its further responsibilities,” it then provided the Legislature with “a number of
alternatives [used by other state legislatures] to assist school districts in providing
a safe environment conducive to learning.”166 The Court listed those alternatives as
follows:
1) Reducing the majority necessary to pass a bond;
2) Allowing taxpayers to designate a portion of their income tax
refund to cover repairs of school facilities;
3) Funding school facilities out of the state general fund;
4) Authorizing a study to determine the actual cost of providing a
thorough education;
5) Establishing a school facilities fund supported by a percentage of
corporate income tax revenue; or
6) Creating an emergency school building repair program to fund
school districts' urgent repair needs.167
The Court then reiterated what it perceived as its limited role in the remedial
phase of the case168 and concluded as follows:
In adopting Article IX, the citizens of Idaho placed their trust in the
collective wisdom, creativity, and expertise of our legislators, and we
do the same. We are firmly convinced the Legislature will carry out its
constitutional duties in good faith and in a timely manner. At this
juncture, we will not remand the case to the district court, but will
retain jurisdiction to consider future legislative efforts to comply with
the constitutional mandate to provide a safe environment conducive to
learning so that we may exercise our constitutional role in interpreting
the constitution and assuring that its provisions are met.169

166. ISEEO V, 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460.
167. Id.
168. Thus, the Court stated:
Of course, we do not, and cannot, today pass on the constitutionality of any or all of these
options as they may apply to school funding in Idaho, as that question has not yet been
presented to us. By listing these alternatives, we are in no way usurping the Legislature's
role; we leave the policy decisions to that separate branch of government, subject to our
continuing responsibility to ensure Idaho's constitutional provisions are satisfied.
Id.
169. Id. At least two trial court judges have pointed out that, during the many years that state
constitutional challenges to the adequacy of K-12 school funding have been pending, “courts in several
States have struggled with the question of remedy after reaching a conclusion that the particular State
was not meeting its State constitutional obligation regarding public school education.” Hancock ex rel.
Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 WL 877984, at *145 (Super. Ct. Mass. April 26, 2004), quoted in,
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The Court issued its standard Remittitur in ISEEO V a few days later, stating
that “having announced its Opinion in this cause December 21, 2005, which has
now become final . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith
comply with the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required.”170
7. ISEEO VI – The Court Resolves the Issue of Payment of the Special Master’s
Costs, but “The Case is Over” – in Both the Trial Court and Idaho Supreme
Court – while Remedial Issues Remain Unresolved
In April 2006, Plaintiffs filed a report with the Court advising it that, during the
2006 legislative session, the Legislature had failed to fulfill its constitutional
mandate regarding funding of the public school system.171 In their report, plaintiffs
requested that the Court release its retention of jurisdiction and provide directions
to Judge Bail on how to proceed with the remedial phase of the case.172
In late-May 2006, at an informal scheduling conference in the ISEEO case and
a related matter,173 plaintiffs' counsel asked the Clerk of the Court about the status
of the case. The Clerk replied that the case was over.174 Counsel sought clarification
by asking, “You mean it's over in the Supreme Court?”175 The Clerk then repeated,
Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *8 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004). Those same two
judges recommended to their respective state appellate courts “that . . . [each] court continue to retain
jurisdiction over the case to allow the court, or a single justice, or a judge of the superior court to monitor
the remedial phase and provide whatever direction may be necessary.” Hancock, 2004 WL 877984 at
*146, quoted in, Montoy, 2004 WL 1094555, at *8. Appellate courts have generally agreed with this
sentiment in school funding cases, deciding variously to retain jurisdiction themselves concerning the
remedial aspect of the case, Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513, 554 (Kan. 2017); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.Ed.2d
993, 1020–22 (Ohio 2000) (“DeRolph II”); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 576 (N. J. 1994) (“Abbott III”);
Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 693 (Mont. 1989), or refusing to retain jurisdiction
itself, but remanding the remedial phase of the case to the trial court so the lower court could monitor
legislative compliance (or lack thereof) with the appellate court’s liability determination. DeRolph v.
State, 678 N.E.2d 886, 887–88 (Ohio 1997) (“DeRolph I”). A few appellate courts, however, have refused
to retain jurisdiction in these circumstance, Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 766 (Kan. 2006), or allow the
trial judge to so. Bismarck Public Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 263 (N.D. 1994). For a further
discussion concerning the rationale underlying an appellate court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over
the remedial phase of school funding litigation and, specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
ISEEO V to do so, see infra notes 231–241 and accompanying text.
170. Kress v. Copple-Trout, No. CV-07-261-S-BLW, 2008 WL 352620, *1, *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 7,
2008). When used to effect a remand, the remittitur sends the case “back to the court from which it
came.” Slater v. Slater, 241 P.2d 1189, 1190, 72 Idaho 383, 385 (1952).
Justice Jim Jones concurred and dissented. Justice Jones agreed with much of the majority’s
opinion in what he referred to as “this marathon case.” 129 P.3d at 1209, 142 Idaho at 460. However,
Justice Jones “decline[d] to affirm the district court's factual findings” for three reasons. Id. at 1210, 142
Idaho at 461. “First, the district court failed to define the components of a ‘safe environment conducive
to learning.’ Second, the district court's ruling is based upon insubstantial and inadequate evidence.
Third, the district court failed to consider the effect of the laws enacted in 2000.” Id. Although Justice
Jones was not inclined to remand the case to the district court for further proceedings, he believed that
the high court itself should appoint a special master to assist the Court in bringing the matter to a
conclusion. Id. at 1213, 142 Idaho at 464.
171. Kress, 2008 WL 352620 at *1.
172. Id.
173. The related matter was State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District, 152 P.3d 566, 143
Idaho 695 (2007) (“ISEEO VI”); see infra notes 181–193 and accompanying text.
174. Kress, 2008 WL 352620 at *1.
175. Id.
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“No, it's over.”176 Plaintiffs' counsel sought further clarification by asking whether
the Clerk meant that the case was over on both the district court and supreme court
levels.177 The Clerk responded that it was.178 No formal decision accompanied the
Clerk's pronouncement.179
By Order, dated December 1, 2006, district judge Bail confirmed her
understanding regarding the Court’s Opinion and Remittitur in IEESO V, stating that
“because the Idaho Supreme Court has retained jurisdiction and has not remanded
any aspect of the remedial phase to the trial court at this time, no action will be
taken on any pending motions because this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
them.”180
Approximately two months later, and little over a year after its decision in
ISEEO V, the Court took up matters it had reserved in that case, i.e., issues related
to the district court’s appointment of a special master prior to the Court’s retaining
jurisdiction.181 In ISEEO VI, The Court first summarized the circumstances existing in
the remedial phase of the case that had caused the district court to appoint the
special master:
The district court bifurcated the proceeding and the “remedy phase” of
the trial was deferred to give the Legislature time to address the school
funding issue. After waiting for the Legislature to respond, the district
judge concluded both that the Legislature had failed to take
appropriate action and that she had been tasked with finding a remedy
to the problem based on the Supreme Court's decision in ISEEO III.
To remedy the problem, the district judge decided it was necessary for
her to evaluate the present condition of Idaho's school districts and to
find a cost-effective method for addressing their deficiencies. In a
December 2002 written order (Order), the district court confirmed its
November 2002 referral of the matter to a special master. . . . [A]s a
part of the Order, the district judge assessed all of the costs of
the special master against the State, giving as a reason that “the only
reason that the Court is appointing a special remedial master to assist
in the remedy phase is that the Legislature has not yet established a
system which would meet its responsibility to ensure that the schools
had a ‘safe environment conducive to learning.’ ”182
Next, as it had done in ISEEO V, the Court framed the issue before it by
pointing out what it would be deciding and what it would not:

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kress, 2008 WL 352620 at *2.
See ISEEO VI, 152 P.3d 566, 143 Idaho 695.
Id. at 568–69, 143 Idaho at 697–98.
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[I]t is important to point out what has not been raised by the State as
an issue in this case and, therefore, what issues this Court is not
deciding in this opinion. The State has raised no challenge regarding the
district judge's ability to appoint a special master and allocate costs, nor
is the State challenging the district judge's determination . . . that
exceptional circumstances existed . . . which she believed justified the
appointment of a special master. Neither has the state raised a
challenge regarding the level of detailed direction the special master
received. The only issue the State has raised . . . is a narrow one:
whether or not the judge properly ordered the State to pay the special
master's costs during the pendency of the litigation.183
The Court affirmed the district court’s decision on that narrow issue.184
Specifically, the Court held that the district court had the statutory authority to
order the State defendants to pay the costs for the special master either before or
after entry of judgment, the costs could be paid out of the State general fund, and
the district court did not abuse its discretion in making its order.185 In so holding,
the Court, downplaying the gravity of the State being ordered by the judiciary to
pay for significant aspects of the remedial phase of the case,
recognize[d] that the district judge, in assessing costs against the State,
presented three possible sources from which funds to pay the special
master could be drawn. Under I.C. § 12–118,186 the judge need only
have entered an order of costs against the State. . . . Idaho Code § 12–
118 is sufficient in its provision that the state controller shall draw upon
the general fund to pay costs against the State. How the State proceeds
with appropriation from particular accounts is the business of the State
and not of this Court.187
Justice Jim Jones specially concurred, primarily for the reasons stated in his
concurrence in ISEEO V.188 Justice Pro Tem Kidwell dissented, pointing to the lack of
legislative appropriation and separation of powers issues:
183. Id. at 571, 143 Idaho at 700. The State’s decision not to appeal Judge Bail’s appointment of
the special master (as opposed to her decision requiring the State to pay his costs while the case was
pending) was not surprising. Numerous courts have either appointed or approved the appointment of
special masters to resolve factual issues in K-12 school funding litigation – particularly when the court
believes the legislature has not taken sufficient measures to provide additional funding for schools.
Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 444–46 (N. J. 1997) (“Abbott IV”); Lake View School Dist. No.
25 v. Huckabee, 144 S.W.3d 741, 742 (Ark. 2004) (appointment) and 210 S.W.3d 28, 30 (Ark. 2005)
(reappointment); Durant v. State Board of Educ., 381 N.W.2d 662, 675 (Mich. 1985). Other courts,
however, have declined requests to appointment special masters in school funding cases. DeRolph v.
State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1022 (Ohio 2000); Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 744 A.2d 1107, 1108-09
(Ohio 1999).
184. ISEEO VI, 152 P.3d at 572, 143 Idaho at 701.
185. Id. at 571–73, 143 Idaho at 695.
186. Idaho Code § 12-118 (2020) provides that “[w]hen the state is a party and costs are awarded
against it, they must be paid out of the state treasury, and the state controller shall draw his warrant
therefor on the general fund.”
187. ISEEO VI, 152 P.3d at 573, 143 Idaho at 702.
188. Id. at 573–74, 143 Idaho at 702–03; see supra note 170.
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Here the issue is the separation of powers clash presented when two
branches of government see the issue through a different prism. Until
the legislative branch of government that controls the purse strings
gives its approval, no state funds exist to pay the special master.
....
Further, this Court acknowledged that there would not be a remedial
phase of the trial and that the responsibility to remedy an
unconstitutional system is the duty of the legislative branch. The special
master proceeding, as all seem to agree, is a part of the remedial phase.
Thus, given the facts before this Court and the Writ of Prohibition that
has been requested, the relief should be granted and the special master
should have to await action of the Legislature for his payment.189
On February 20, 2007, i.e. less than a month after the Court’s decision in ISEEO
VI concerning the issues relating to the special master, the Court issued an
Amended Remittitur in ISEEO V.190 In the Amended Remittitur, the Court made
absolutely clear that, after nearly seventeen years of litigation and six appeals to
the state high court, the ISEEO case was indeed over at both the district court and
supreme court levels.191 In that document, the Court stated that the “Court having
announced its Opinion in this cause December 21, 2005, which has now become
final . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is CLOSED and consistent with the
Remittitur issued February 20, 2007, in State of Idaho v. District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District, Docket No. 29203, the District Court shall have no further
jurisdiction in this matter.”192 On June 6, 2007, in response to plaintiffs' motion for
clarification, the Court filed an “Order Denying Motion for Clarification of Amended
Remittitur.”193
8. Kress v. Copple-Trout – A Federal Court “Hail Mary”
The ISEEO plaintiffs, having been denied a remedy in state court, turned to
federal court. On June 13, 2007, one week after the Court’s denial of their motion
for clarification, plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Idaho federal district court against the
individual Justices of the Idaho Supreme Court who had ruled against them after
the Court’s decision in ISEEO V.194 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs sought an order
189. Id. at 574–75, 143 Idaho at 703–04.
190. Kress v. Copple-Trout, No. CV-07-261-S-BLW, 2008 WL 352620, at *2 (D. Idaho Feb. 7, 2008).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. For a discussion concerning the various approaches taken by state Supreme Courts and
scholars on the issue of adjudicating and granting remedies for proven violations of state constitutional
education clause provisions, including categorization of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision to not grant
a remedy to plaintiffs in the ISEEO matter, see infra notes 242–249 and accompanying text.
194. Id.; Plaintiff Kress and the other plaintiffs in the federal court action were plaintiffs in the
ISEEO matter.
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requiring the Court to direct or allow the state district court to conduct a remedial
phase of the trial.195 Alternatively, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the
Court had violated Plaintiffs' due process rights.196 The case was assigned to Idaho
district court judge B. Lynn Winmill.197 The Justices then moved to dismiss the
Complaint and, in turn, the plaintiffs sought summary judgment on their due
process claim.198
The Justices sought dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.199
According to Judge Winmill, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine precludes “lower federal
courts . . . from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments,
because jurisdiction over such appeals is vested exclusively with the United States
Supreme Court.”200 Thus, under Rooker–Feldman, “’[i]f the constitutional claims
presented to a United States District Court are inextricably intertwined with the
state court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application for
relief, then the District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state
court decision. This the District Court may not do.’”201 Judge Winmill noted,
however, that Rooker-Feldman “is ‘a narrow doctrine, confined to cases . . . brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.’”202
Judge Winmill first distinguished the case before him from the typical RookerFeldman circumstances:
This case does not fit that narrow definition. Plaintiffs do not complain
about a state-court judgment. In fact, Plaintiffs are not the state-court
losers; Plaintiffs prevailed on both the lower court level and on appeal
195. Id.
196. Kress, 2008 WL 352620, at *2. Because challenging a state’s system for funding K-12 public
education under a state constitutional provision does not raise a federal question, plaintiffs seldom have
reason or are able to seek redress related to such state constitutional challenges in federal court. See,
e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982) (state's public school finance system does not
violate equal protection clause of state or federal constitution or the education article of state
constitution), appeal dismissed, Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983) (dismissed for want of
substantial federal question). Certainly, follow-on federal court litigation seeking to vindicate student
federal antidiscrimination or disability rights after state courts have ruled in plaintiffs’ favor on their state
constitutional claims has occasionally occurred. See, e.g., Friends of the Lakeview School Dist. Inc., No.
25 of Phillips Cnty v. Huckabee, No. 2:04CV00184GH, 2005 WL 2076478 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 25, 2005) (racial
discrimination claims); Thompson v. Ohio, No. C2-91-464, 2000 WL 1456995 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2000)
(disability rights claims). That said, however, the ISEEO plaintiffs’ pursuit of their state constitutional
remedial rights in federal court was both laudable and unusual to say the least. See Scott R. Bauries, The
Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 734 (2012) [hereinafter Education Duty] (“Although [Kress v.
Copple-Trout] . . . was ultimately dismissed on Rooker-Feldman Doctrine grounds, it stands as a powerful
rejoinder to those who would dismiss the interests of plaintiffs who are told that they have rights and
that these rights have been violated, but who receive no specific relief.”).
197. Kress, 2008 WL 352620, at *1.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *2.
200. Id. (citing Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006)) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)).
201. Kress, 2008 WL 352620 at *2 (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895. 898 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)).
202. Kress, 2008 WL 352620 at *2 (quoting Lance, 546 U.S. at 464).
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to the Idaho Supreme Court with respect to their claim that the current
school funding system in Idaho is insufficient to carry out the
legislature's duty under the Idaho Constitution. Instead, Plaintiffs take
issue with the apparent lack of a remedy and final judgment. As
outlined above, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
declaratory judgment, and retained jurisdiction over the matter, clearly
indicating that the state district court would have no further jurisdiction
to fashion a remedy.203
Judge Winmill then pointed out the ambiguity in the Court’s treatment of the
remedial phase of the case:
However, what the Idaho Supreme Court did from that point is more
difficult to unravel. On the one hand, the Idaho Supreme Court
indicated that it was retaining jurisdiction “to consider future legislative
efforts to comply with the constitutional mandate” so that the court
could “exercise [its] constitutional role in interpreting the constitution
and assuring that its provisions are met.” . . . This seemed to suggest
that the Idaho Supreme Court would oversee the legislature's
compliance with its decision. On the other hand, when Plaintiffs
attempted to reopen the case to establish that the Idaho legislature did
nothing during its 2006 session to cure the constitutional deficiency in
the funding of public schools, Plaintiffs were met with an informal
announcement from the Clerk of the Court that the case was over.
Plaintiffs later received an order from the Idaho Supreme Court
informing them that the appeal was closed. . . . No other explanation
was provided.204
The Judge next described the untenable position in which the Court had left
plaintiffs after seventeen years of litigation:
Thus, Plaintiffs are seemingly stuck in limbo. They have succeeded on
the merits before both the state district court and the Idaho Supreme
Court. However, they have been neither granted nor expressly denied
a remedy by the Idaho Supreme Court. It is unclear whether they have
any further remedies before the Idaho Supreme Court. It is equally
unclear whether they have a final decision that they could appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.205
Again pointing out plaintiffs’ Court-induced conundrum and again
distinguishing Rooker-Feldman, Judge Winmill concluded as follows:

203. Kress, 2008 WL 352620 at *3.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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Because the Idaho Supreme Court has retained jurisdiction, Plaintiffs
cannot seek a remedy through the state district court, and they have
nothing to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Likewise,
Plaintiffs cannot seek further relief from the Idaho Supreme Court
because the appeal has been closed. Assuming, without deciding, that
Plaintiffs' quandary entitles them to assert a Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim, it is clear that such a claim (1) is not one asserted by
a state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by a state-court
judgment, and (2) does not invite the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
over a final state-court judgment. Therefore, the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine does not bar Plaintiffs' action. Accordingly, the Court
will deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.206
Judge Winmill turned next to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on
their due process claim.207 After recounting the Court’s treatment of the remedial
phase of the case,208 Judge Winmill pondered several questions concerning the
Court’s compliance with its constitutional responsibilities:
[T]he current posture of the case is uncertain. It is unclear how, or
whether, the Idaho Supreme Court intends to proceed in “ . . .
exercis[ing][its] constitutional role in interpreting the constitution and
assuring that its provisions are met.” . . . The evidence before the Court
leaves this Court asking a series of questions: (1) has the Idaho Supreme
Court expressly refused to provide Plaintiffs with a remedy by closing
the appeal, but retaining jurisdiction; (2) has the Idaho Supreme Court
effectively refused to provide Plaintiffs with a remedy by refusing to set
any reasonable time-lines for a remedy phase of the case; and (3) does
the Idaho Supreme Court intend to take other steps to ensure that the
state legislature complies with the Idaho Constitution. The scenario
suggested by the first question would appear to create a due process
violation. . . . The scenarios suggested by the second and third questions
may or may not constitute a due process violation depending on the
steps contemplated and taken by the Idaho Supreme Court.209

206. Id.
207. Id. at **4–5.
208. Id. at *4; see supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
209. Kress, 2008 WL 352620 at *5. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall, quoting
Blackstone, stated that “’it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is
also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.’” 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)
(quoting 3 Blackstone Commentaries at 23). Following on Marshall’s pronouncement, courts and
commentators have recognized that fundamental principles of due process require that aggrieved
plaintiffs have access to meaningful judicial remedies for constitutional violations. See, e.g., Harper v.
Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1993); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429
(1982); Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy under Due Process,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUMBIA L. REV. 309, 338 (1993).
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Given the posture of the case, Judge Winmill denied plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment.210 The Judge concluded by sending a message to the Court,
“not[ing] that an expedited order by the Idaho Supreme Court clarifying the posture
of the state-court action may be all that is needed to facilitate a quick and
inexpensive resolution of this case.”211
The Court and its individual justices, rather than providing the clarification
suggested by Judge Winmill, moved to reconsider his ruling on their motion to
dismiss.212 Specifically, the defendants argued that, no matter how plaintiffs
attempted to characterize their claims, plaintiffs were seeking mandamus relief,
which was not available under the circumstances of the case.213
Judge Winmill agreed and reversed his prior decision.214 The Judge first noted
that principles of judicial immunity do not bar a federal court from ordering
injunctive or declaratory relief against state judicial officers acting in their judicial
capacity.215 However, he pointed out that “’federal courts are without power to
issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the
performance of their duties’”216 and cited a number of cases which had held that “a
request for injunctive or declaratory relief, which asks a federal court to order a
state officer or agency to perform certain duties, is not a request for injunctive or
declaratory relief—it is a request for a writ of mandamus.”217
Applying these principles of federalism, Judge Winmill concluded that he had
erred initially and had no choice but to grant defendants’ motions to reconsider and
to dismiss:
Plaintiffs are attempting to re-define a request for mandamus relief as
one for declaratory relief. As discussed above, the Court cannot do this.
Plaintiffs' claim has all the indicia of a request for mandamus relief, and
this Court cannot construe it as anything but a request for mandamus
relief. As the saying goes, if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck and
quacks like a duck, then it's a duck. Accordingly, because “federal courts
are without power to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts or
their judicial officers in the performance of their duties,” this Court is
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Kress v. Copple-Trout, No. CV-07-261-S-BLW 2008 WL 2095602 (D. Idaho May 16, 2008).
213. Id. at *1.
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id. (quoting Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984)).
216. Kress, 2008 WL 2095602 at *2 (quoting Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir.
1966)).
217. Kress, 2008 WL 2095602 at *2 (citing Oliver v. Sup. Ct. of Plymouth Cty., 799 F. Supp. 1273,
1274 (D.Mass.1992) (plaintiff's ostensible request for injunctive relief against the Superior Court, asking
the court to perform various administrative functions, is a request for a writ of mandamus); Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (an action purportedly requesting a mandatory
injunction against a federal official is analyzed as a request for mandamus relief, despite appellant’s
suggestion otherwise); Johnson v. Bigelow, 2007 WL 1170756, *1 (5th Cir. 2007) (Court acknowledged
that judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive or declaratory relief in civil rights actions, but
federal courts have no authority to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their
duties)).
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without jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' claim. . . . Thus, the Court will,
after careful reconsideration of its prior decision, grant Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.218
9. Joki v. State of Idaho – A Second “Hail Mary” in State Court
The plaintiffs did not appeal Judge Winmill’s decision and judgment in
Kress.219 Their attorney, however, did re-assert the ISEEO plaintiffs’ state
constitutional thoroughness claim several years later in Joki v. State of Idaho.220 In
Joki, a student's guardian and several other plaintiffs filed a complaint against the
State of Idaho, the state legislature, the State Board of Education, the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, every Idaho school district and one charter
school seeking reimbursement of certain fees imposed by school districts, and, via
an amended complaint, a declaratory judgment that the system of funding K-12
public education was unconstitutional.221 The district court dismissed both claims
against the State defendants on the grounds that (1) plaintiffs’ claims – including
their second claim, which sought, in effect, to enforce the Court’s determination in
ISEEO V that the Legislature’s system of funding schools was unconstitutional –
were governed by the procedural requirements of the Constitutionally Based
Educational Claims Act (“CBECA”)222 and (2) by suing the State defendants without
first pursuing claims and exhausting remedies against school districts, the plaintiffs
had failed to comply with the CBECA.223
On appeal, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision.224 The Court
reiterated that, although it had held HB 403’s amendment to CBECA
unconstitutional in ISEEO IV, it had not ruled on the constitutionality of CBECA as a
whole in that case225 and, indeed, had subsequently upheld CBECA’s
constitutionality in Osmunson v. State.226 The Court then agreed with the district
court’s dismissal of the claims against the State defendants, opining regarding the
CBECA’s procedural requirements and the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with them as
follows:
218. Kress, 2008 WL 2095602 at *2 (quoting Clark, 366 F.2d at 681).
219. During oral argument on the individual justices’ motion for reconsideration, Judge Winmill
variously opined that the case was “a head-scratcher,” “I think if you were to run this by 100 law
professors . . . 95 would say there’s no way in the world you can enjoin a state court, [b]ut five would
say you can, and they may be right,” and “I think you’ll be on your way to the 9th Circuit in short order,
after I take a stab at it.” Betsy Z. Russell, Judge Hears School Funding Suit, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 2,
2008),
https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2008/may/02/judge-hears-school-fundingsuit/?clearUserState=true. It is unclear why the Kress plaintiffs never appealed Judge Winmill’s decision.
Although plaintiffs and their counsel certainly know best, the decision to forego appellate review of the
decision was likely based on a combination of the long odds for success and the cost of pursuing the
matter with the Ninth Circuit.
220. 394 P.3d 48, 162 Idaho 5 (2017).
221. Id. at 49, 162 Idaho at 6.
222. See supra notes 96–98, 118 and 123 and accompanying text.
223. Joki, 394 P.3d at 50–51, 162 Idaho at 7–8.
224. Id. at 54, 162 Idaho at 11.
225. Id. at 53, 162 Idaho at 10 (citing ISEEO V, 97 P.3d at 464, 140 Idaho at 597); see supra note
103.
226. 394 P.3d at 52, 162 Idaho at 9 (citing Osmunson v. State, 17 P.3d 236, 240, 242, 135 Idaho
292, 296 and 298 (2000)).
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[A] patron . . . may bring a suit against the state “on the ground that the
state has not established and maintained a general, uniform and
thorough system of public, free common schools.” . . . Crucially, though,
[this] . . . type of standing requires that the patron first sue the local
school district and obtain authorization from a district court to add a
state defendant. . . . “Any patron suit against the state . . . not
authorized by the district court pursuant to this section shall be
dismissed.”
....
Because Joki did not obtain authorization from the district court to add
the State Defendants, the district court's dismissal of the State
Defendants was not in error.227
After nearly twenty years of litigation in state and federal court over a period
of twenty-seven years, and after the ISEEO plaintiffs had obtained a ruling from the
Idaho Supreme Court that the Legislature had failed to comply with its
constitutional duty to provide a thorough system of K-12 public education, but had
received no judicial determination on whether any remedial action taken by the
Legislature was constitutionally sufficient, the case unceremoniously came to an
end.
B. Analysis
Because the Idaho Supreme Court did not conduct a hearing or issue an
Opinion setting forth its reasons for dismissing the ISEEO case, there has never been
any public pronouncement by the Court explaining or justifying its decision. Thus,
unless the members of the Court or their judicial papers reveal their thinking on the
issue in the future,228 the many individuals and institutions interested in
understanding the Court’s reasoning – Idaho citizens and residents, the parties to
the litigation, including the schoolchildren of Idaho, their parents and guardians,
school administrators, school districts and the Legislature, lower Idaho courts, the
practicing bar, and academics, as well as their peers in other states – have very little
to go on in answering the following two, related questions:
227. 394 P.3d at 52, 54, 162 Idaho at 9-10, 14 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 6-2205).
228. Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.10, Comment [3], provides as follows:
A judge may comment on legal terms, statutory language, procedural rules and legal
concepts if any allegation is made concerning the judge’s official conduct. The judge would
be well advised to issue any such comments through the Administrative Office of the
Courts. Judges are cautioned, however, there should never be comments on the results of
a case consistent with Rule 2.10(A) (emphasis added)
One well known former Solicitor General, Circuit Court Judge, and law school dean has
commented that “justices and judges speak only through formal, written opinions, not by appearances
at the National Press Club or out on the hustings.” Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court, the Constitution
and the Rule of Law, 73 JUDICATURE 159, 161 (1989).
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1) First, and preliminarily, although the subject of some explanation
in the Court’s ISEEO V decision, why did the Court choose to retain
jurisdiction concerning the remedial phase of the case after affirming
Judge Bail’s decision holding that the Idaho Legislature had failed to
meet its obligation to provide a thorough system of K-12 public
education under the Idaho Constitution? and
2) Second, and far more important and perplexing, why did the Court,
after affirming Judge Bail’s liability determination in its ISEEO V decision,
dismiss the case without hearing, deciding or otherwise adjudicating the
remedial phase of the case?229
Given the Court’s failure to provide any reasons (at least as to the second
question), at this juncture, those interested in finding definitive answers to these
questions ultimately must be satisfied with uncertain explanations, albeit
explanations informed by the seven ISEEO or ISEEO-related Idaho Supreme Court
Opinions and Judge Winmill’s two decisions in the Kress federal court case. Based
on those decisions, this Article will take up each question in turn.
1.

The Court’s Decision to Retain Jurisdiction over the ISEEO Matter

As discussed previously, courts in school funding cases have ample discretion,
after affirming that the state legislature has not met its state constitutional
obligation to adequately fund K-12 public schools, to either return decision making
concerning the remedial phase of the case to the trial court or retain jurisdiction
itself.230 Indeed, both inside and outside the school funding context, i.e. in civil
litigation generally, when an appellate court enunciates a legal standard or affirms
a trial court’s application of that standard, the appellate court invariably remands
remaining and/or previously unresolved issues in the case, including remedial
questions, to the trial court.231
The school funding case law suggests two diametrically opposite reasons why
an appellate court would decide to retain jurisdiction over the remedial phase of
the case when the legislature has not complied with a determination by the
appellate court that it (the legislature) has a justiciable obligation under the state
constitution to adequately or equitably fund K-12 public schools and either the trial
court or the appellate court (or both) has determined that the legislature has not
met its remedial duties. In most of the cases, the state appellate court has retained
jurisdiction under those circumstances because it perceives the legislature as
malingering or stalling by failing to provide constitutionally sufficient funding to
229. The questions are related, because they demarcate the critical decision points in the ISEEO
litigation where the Court first signaled and then made abundantly clear that the Idaho judiciary would
not take an active—and, ultimately, any—role in the remedial phase of the case.
230. See supra note 169.
231. See id.; see also ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE – FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL
APPEALS, JUDGMENT AND MANDATE IN TRIAL COURT, § 17.2 at p.262 (1983) (“When the mandate and record
are returned to the trial court, . . . [t]he trial court . . . may conduct further proceedings not inconsistent
with the mandate, including deciding any issues left open by the mandate.”) and CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER AND EDWARD H. COOPER, 18B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MANDATE RULE, § 4478.3 at
p.713 (3rd ed. 2019) (“When further trial-court proceedings are appropriate after remand, the appellate
mandate commonly leaves the trial court free to decide matters that were not resolved on appeal.”).
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public schools and, in effect, has decided to “up the ante” in the remedial phase of
the case.232 As the Washington Supreme Court eloquently put it in retaining
jurisdiction in that state’s second protracted school funding case:
What we have learned from experience is that this court cannot stand
on the sidelines and hope the State meets its constitutional mandate to
amply fund education. Article IX, section 1 is a mandate, not to a single
branch of government, but to the entire state. . . . We will not abdicate
our judicial role.233
In some cases, however, the appellate court has retained jurisdiction and not
remanded the matter to the trial court when, although not concluding that the
legislature had completely complied with its state constitutional duty to sufficiently
fund K-12 public schools, the appellate court has largely been satisfied with the
efforts of the legislature and also viewed the trial court and/its relationship with
the legislature as problematic.234 Thus, In Kansas’s similarly protracted school
funding litigation, the Kansas Supreme Court retained jurisdiction after noting that
A review of sixteen other state Supreme Court decisions that have
declared their systems for funding public education unconstitutional
reveals that a majority of those decisions remanded the case to a trial
court. However, it is those states that have had the most difficulty
producing a final plan that met the Supreme Court's opinion of
constitutionality. . . . In each of these states, either the final public
school funding plan is not yet approved by the Supreme Court of the
state after several years of litigation after remand or the plan has been
approved only after several years of litigation.235
Indeed, under these latter circumstances, the Kansas Supreme Court retained
jurisdiction and directed the trial court to dismiss the long running school funding
litigation in the Sunflower (or Jayhawk) State.236
In ISEEO V, the Idaho Supreme Court appeared to retain jurisdiction and not
remand the case to Judge Bail at the trial court for the more legislatively deferential
reasons expressed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Montoy and by Chief Judge
Moyer, concurring and dissenting in Ohio’s school funding ligation in DeRolph and
not for the more legislatively critical reasons expressed by the State Supreme
Courts in McCleary and a later opinion in DeRolph. Thus, the Idaho high court
232. See supra note 169.
233. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 259 (Wash. 2012) (en banc); see also DeRolph v. State, 728
N.E.2d 993, 1018–19 (Ohio 2000).
234. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006).
235. Montoy, 138 P.3d at 765–66 (quoting DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St. 3d 419, 421–22, 678
N.E.2d 886, 888 (Ohio 1997) (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the
majority's decision to remand the case to the district court pending legislative compliance so the trial
court could hear evidence concerning the remedy after it is enacted and determine any new legislation's
constitutionality)).
236. Montoy, 138 P.2d at 765–66.
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“commended” the Legislature concerning the efforts it had made to address the
Court’s decision in ISEEO III and, more specifically, to address Judge Bail’s decision
after trial.237 To be sure, the Court affirmed Judge Bail’s liability determination when
it found and concluded that the Legislature had not met its thoroughness obligation
under the Idaho Constitution238 and reiterated its holding in ISEEO I, stating that
“[w]e are mindful of our duty to determine whether the current funding system
passes constitutional muster.”239 Also, unlike its brethren on the Kansas Supreme
Court, the Idaho high court did not capture the case to kill it, at least immediately,
i.e. the Court did not retain jurisdiction and then order immediate dismissal of the
case. The Court, however, did make clear in ISEEO V that “[t]he appropriate remedy
. . . must be fashioned by the Legislature and not this Court,” and “[i]t is not our
intent to substitute our judgment on how to establish criteria for safe buildings or
create a proper funding system for that of the Legislature.”240 And, in the next ISEEO
case that came before it, the Court all but directly stated that Judge Bail had
overstepped the bounds of her remedial jurisdiction while the case had remained
with her. Thus, in evaluating Judge Bail’s actions after she determined that the
Legislature had not met its constitutional responsibilities and before the Court took
remedial jurisdiction away from her, the Court opined that Judge Bail had
“concluded both that the Legislature had failed to take appropriate action and that
she had been tasked with finding a remedy to the problem based on the Supreme
Court's decision in ISEEO III.”241
In sum, the available evidence suggests that, rather than retaining jurisdiction
in ISEEO V to monitor what it believed was a recalcitrant Idaho legislature and push
that legislative body (and the Governor’s office) toward a constitutionally sufficient
level of funding, the Court more likely retained jurisdiction to cabin in Judge Bail
who the Court viewed as becoming increasingly and inappropriately proactive (and
not sufficiently deferential to a co-equal branch of government) regarding the
remedial phase of the case.
2. The Court’s Decision to Dismiss the ISEEO Case without Granting a Remedy or
Determining whether, Post-ISEEO V, the Legislature had Sufficiently Funded K12 Schools to Meet its Thoroughness Obligation Under the Idaho Constitution
a. The Lay of the State Constitutional Education Clause Land Concerning
Enforcement and Remediation – Judicial Decisions and Scholarship
To understand the dynamics at play concerning the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision to dismiss the ISEEO litigation without granting a remedy and without
affording the plaintiffs a hearing after previously affirming Judge Bail’s liability
determination, it is helpful to place the Court’s decision in the context of decision
237. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. The Court further pointed out that, “[t]o
remedy the problem, the district judge decided it was necessary for her to evaluate the present condition
of Idaho's school districts and to find a cost-effective method for addressing their deficiencies” and, to
assist her in doing so, to appoint a special master. Id.
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making by other state Supreme Courts concerning similar state constitutional
adequacy challenges. Professor Scott Bauries cogently has addressed this judicial
dilemma, framing the issue as follows:
Given both the indeterminacy in constitutional language and the
understandable tendency to reach for lofty and aspirational standards,
approaching the education clause substantively gives rise to a
significant concern—whether a state court may, consistent with the
separation of powers, mandamus or otherwise enjoin a legislature to
raise or allocate additional revenue for the state's education system
where the court sees current funding levels as not “thorough,”
“efficient,” “suitable,” “adequate,” or “high quality.”242
Professor Bauries then summarized the several approaches taken by state
high courts on the adjudication and remediation issue, stating as follows:
Facing this concern, courts have taken one of three paths. About a third
of courts have dismissed cases asking for such enforcement on grounds
of non-justiciability, concluding that, because affirmative duty
provisions are directed at state legislatures and because their terms are
so subjective, these legislatures are vested with complete and
unreviewable discretion. Another third or so have engaged the merits
of the claims and chosen either a deferential form of review--such as
the federal “rational basis” test, upholding the legislation against the
challenge--or a non-deferential form of review, construing the
education clause as an absolute command to create an “adequate”
system of schools (or some variant of the term). These courts ultimately
hold against the state and use that holding as a justification for a public
law injunction to legislate the system into constitutionally valid status.
A final third have engaged in review of the merits of such cases, applied
a non-deferential form of review, and found the state constitution
violated, only to step back at that stage and deny the plaintiffs any sort
of directive remedial order against the legislature.243
Roughly tracking the several paths taken by courts in state education clause
cases, scholars have advocated for varying degrees of judicial enforcement and

242. Education Duty, supra note 196, at 730.
243. Education Duty, supra note 196, at 730–31; Bauries has written several other articles
concerning judicial enforcement of state constitutional education clauses and remediation (or lack
thereof of) of legislative violations of those same provisions. See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and
Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 340–
49 (2011) [hereinafter Conceptual Convergence]; Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?:
Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 701, 721–34 (2010) [hereinafter Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy].
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remediation in those matters.244 Thus, regarding cases like ISEEO, where the Idaho
Supreme Court adjudicated the merits of plaintiffs’ thoroughness claim and found
in plaintiffs’ favor but did not issue a remedial order against the legislature, some
scholars have endorsed this middle ground approach as striking an appropriate
balance between judicial or remedial abstention and activism, characterizing the
approach as proper “dialogic” judicial decision making.245 In contrast, regarding
cases falling on the judicial abstention end of the spectrum, i.e. cases where state
Supreme Courts have found state education clauses to either place no limits on the
legislature’s sovereign prerogative or have dismissed such claims as non-justiciable,
other scholars have viewed education clauses as merely “aspirational” and,
therefore, not properly enforceable by the judiciary.246 And, regarding cases on the
judicial activism end of the spectrum, i.e. cases where state Supreme Courts have
adjudicated education clause claims on the merits and, after holding against the
legislature, issued remedial orders, scholars have agreed that courts can and should
either enjoin state officials from continuing to utilize unconstitutional funding
systems,247 or impose more forceful, policy-specific decrees against state
legislatures.248
The Idaho Supreme Court, in its handling and ultimate disposition of the ISEEO
litigation, clearly falls within the “final third” of the courts identified by Bauries. 249
But why did the Court affirm Judge Bail’s determination that the Idaho Legislature
had not met its state constitutional obligation to thoroughly fund Idaho K-12 public
schools, but then dismiss the case without granting a remedy? And was that
disposition proper? As alluded to previously, given the lack of any Opinion by the
Court accompanying its dismissal order, a definitive answer to the first question is
not knowable at this juncture, although something approaching an explanation can
be gleaned from the Court’s numerous ISEEO Opinions and the circumstances and
choices facing the Court when it dismissed the case. An answer to the second
question, however, can be informed by the normative considerations identified in
the state constitutional school funding cases and scholarship discussed immediately

244. See Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 270–80
(2017) (summarizing scholarship) (citing Bauries, Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy, supra note
243, at 721–35).
245. Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV.
73, 76–84, 93–104 (2000) (cited in Weishart, supra note 244, at 273).
246. R. Craig Wood, Justiciability, Adequacy, Advocacy, and the “American Dream,” 92 KY. L. J.
739, 776–78 (2010) (cited in William E. Thro, Originalism and School Finance Litigation, 335 ED. LAW REP.
538, 549 (2016)).
247. Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 196, at 763–64.
248. James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1225–26, 1256
(2008) [hereinafter Standards], and James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool, 94 CAL. L. REV. 49,
84–86 (2006) (both cited in Bauries, Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy, supra note 243, at 730–
31).
249. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 243 at 342–45 & n.240; see also Kayla Louis,
Comment, State Constitutional Law – Minimally Adequate Education Standards in the South Carolina
Constitution, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1457, 1469 & n.97 (2017). As discussed above, Bauries refers to judicial
decisions following into this category as engaging in a “non-deferential form of review” of the
constitutional liability issue. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. That characterization, however,
does not mean that a court falling into this category avoids deferring to the legislative or executive
branches in other significant ways. See infra notes 251–254, 257–261 and accompanying text.
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above and, as such, is within this Article’s grasp. The Article turns now to those
questions.
b. Why the Idaho Supreme Court Dismissed the ISEEO Case without Discussing
the Need for or Granting a Remedy
i. Predictive Signals regarding Executive and Legislative Branch Deference from
the ISEEO Decisions Themselves
Before getting into the substance of this question, a review of the Court’s
Opinions during the protracted ISEEO litigation sheds substantial, predictive light
on the Court’s ultimate disposition of the case. To be sure, the Court’s reasoning
across the numerous Opinions in the case is less than a straight line toward its
decision dismissing the ISEEO matter fourteen years later. As such, the Court’s
Opinions do not consistently reveal the nature of its resolve (or lack thereof) for
taking on the Idaho Legislature concerning that body’s obligation to satisfy state
constitutional requirements. Ultimately, however, several of the Court’s prior ISEEO
decisions on substantive matters fairly predict its later decision to dismiss the case
without addressing the remedial issue.
Starting with ISEEO I, the Court refused to reverse any aspect of its decision in
Thompson, which had rejected a state law equal protection challenge to legislative
disparities in funding amongst and between Idaho school districts.250 The Court
likewise refused to revisit its holding in Thompson that the uniformity clause of Art.
IX, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, although requiring uniformity in curriculum,
did not require uniformity in funding K-12 public schools throughout the State.251
In addition, even as the ISEEO I Court laudably espoused principles of judicial
supremacy and refused to abdicate decision making authority to the Idaho
Legislature concerning responsibility for providing a thorough system of education
under the Idaho Constitution when it rejected the Legislature’s justiciability
defense, the Court simultaneously deferred to its co-equal branches of government
in two respects. First, the Court expressed confidence that the legislature and
executive branches would fulfill their state constitutional duties “in a completely
responsible manner”252 (a reasonable expression of optimism at this relatively early
point in the ISEEO litigation). Second, the Court agreed that “the requirements for
school facilities, instructional programs and textbooks, and transportation systems”
250. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text. Although the Idaho high court had shown
a willingness to interpret Idaho constitutional provisions differently than their similarly worded federal
constitutional counterparts, see, e.g., State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1063, 114 Idaho 293, 299 (1988)
(recognizing more expansive individual rights under Idaho Constitution’s search and seizure provisions
than under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution), the Court concluded that the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, which held that wealth was not a suspect
classification and education was not a fundamental right and which applied the legislatively deferential
rational basis test under the federal equal protection clause, was a powerful analogous precedent
concerning interpreting Idaho’s equal protection clause in a similar K-12 school funding case. See supra
notes 18–19, 34–35 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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promulgated in regulations issued by the Idaho State Board of Education (“SBE”) –
an executive branch agency – under Idaho Code § 33-118 “are consistent with our
view of thoroughness” under Art. IX, Section 1.253 Indeed, the Court went on to state
that if the school district and school administrator plaintiffs in ISEEO could prove
they could not comply with the SBE’s above-mentioned regulatory requirements
with the funding made available to them by the Legislature, plaintiffs would have
made a prima facie case for violation of Idaho’s constitutional thoroughness
requirement.254
Likewise, in ISEEO III, the Court, in further limiting and defining the contours
of plaintiffs’ state constitutional challenges, refused to revisit its prior uniformity
provision decisions255 and also rejected more expansive and equity-based
definitions of thoroughness derived from education clause decisions from other
states.256 As it had in ISEEO I, the Court deferred to and, indeed, adopted executive
and, this time, a portion of legislative branch definitions of thoroughness.257 In this
latter regard, the Court agreed that SBE regulations pertaining to school facilities
and student safety and the Legislature’s post-ISEEO I’s statutory enactment, i.e.
Idaho Code § 33-1612, were “consistent with [its] . . . view of thoroughness,” which
the Court defined as a “safe environment conducive to learning.”258
And, in ISEEO IV, the Court, although rejecting the State’s renewed mootness
challenge and affirming Judge Bail’s decision that the State had violated the
constitutional thoroughness provision,259 once more “commended” the Legislature
for its school funding efforts and “laudable efforts” concerning school safety issues
and creating a safe environment for school children that was conducive to
learning.260 Thus, after fifteen years of litigation, i.e. at a time when the Court could
(and should) have expressed significant concern about the State’s constitutional
violation and impatience with the Legislature’s failure to remedy the continued
funding shortfall on its own, the Court continued to compliment the Legislature for
its efforts, made non-binding suggestions to the Legislature concerning funding
policy matters, and retained jurisdiction over the case for reasons that, as discussed
above, were not designed to light a fire under its legislative counterpart.261
Regarding the Idaho Supreme Court’s deference to and adoption of SBE
regulations and legislative enactments as constitutional benchmarks, executive and
legislative branch standards undoubtedly may be a legitimate starting point for
253. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. The then-existing version of Section 33-118
spoke only to curricular matters – a uniformity concern under the Court’s narrow view of that term – and
did not purport to regulate school facilities, transportation, and the like.
254. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. In defining thoroughness, Section 33-1612
enumerated eight specific “assumptions” governing a thorough system of public education
requirements, only one of which pertained to providing a safe environment conducive to learning. The
other seven statutory provisions, which addressed providing with students with certain curricula and
educational programming, as well as training in the areas of values, discipline, skills, and technology were
not included in the Court’s constitutional definition of thoroughness. Id.
259. See supra notes 136, 156–162 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 237–241 and accompanying text.
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courts performing their judicial duty of defining thoroughness or other state
constitutional education clause terms.262 However, using standards developed by
other branches of government, rather than assisting courts in properly performing
their constitutional duties, may lead to significant undesirable and improper
consequences. First, using those non-judicially developed standards may result in a
narrow definition of education clause terms and, hence, adequacy standards.263
Second, reliance on executive or legislative branch standards to define
thoroughness or adequacy may cause states to lower, via statute or administrative
regulation, constitutional requirements.264 Third, using non-judicially developed
standards to define thoroughness or other constitutionally required indicia of
educational adequacy would lead to an improper delegation of judicial authority.265
Fourth, related and most important, using executive branch standards to set
thoroughness or adequacy requirements “would be to cede to a state agency the
power to define a constitutional right.”266
The Idaho Supreme Court’s initial definitional decisions in ISEEO I and ISEEO
III regarding the Art. IX, Section 1’s uniformity and thoroughness requirements had
an obvious, limiting impact on the scope of the ISEEO plaintiffs’ claims and the
contours of the Idaho Legislature’s obligations under Idaho’s state constitutional
provisions. Thus, in ISEEO V, the Court, in reviewing the breadth of Judge Bail’s trial
court decision concerning thoroughness, believed that she had improperly
expanded the inquiry by evaluating arguments and evidence relating to the
adequacy of state standards concerning course work and programming.267
Although perhaps less obvious, the Court’s willingness in ISEEO I, III and V to limit
the scope of plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims, defer to the SBE’s standards
regarding thoroughness, and acquiesce in the Legislature’s insufficient funding
efforts, portended the Court’s later decisions to defer and subsequently abdicate
to the Idaho Legislature during the remedial phase of the case.
262. See REBELL, supra note 162 at 62–64 (noting that “[a]t times, legislatively enacted state
academic standards have strongly influenced, without fully determining, the content of the
constitutional standards that were ultimately formulated by the state courts”).
263. Ryan, Standards, supra note 248 at 1240.
264. Id. In ISEEO I, the Idaho Supreme Court guarded against this possible outcome by reserving
judgment regarding whether the SBE rules would continue to set the constitutional thoroughness
standard if they were ever amended. See supra note 42.
265. Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education
Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2249-50 (2003) (“The use of existing standards finds no support in state
education clauses . . . . Instead, this approach suggests an easy way to measure adequacy without truly
defining it or identifying appropriate remedies . . . . Adopting such a definition makes no sense without
a constitutional delegation of definitional power to the legislative or executive branch. As the judiciary
typically defines constitutional terms, one would expect a particularly clear delegation of power were
this the case. No state constitution contains such a delegation.”)
266. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 893, 907 (Ct. App. N.Y. 2003), cited in
Anne D. Gordon, California Constitutional Law: The Right to an Adequate Education, 67 HASTINGS L. J. 323,
359–60 & n.233 (2016). As the trial court made clear in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 187 Misc. 2d
1, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (S. Ct. 2001), “this approach would essentially define the ambit of a constitutional
right by whatever a state agency says it is. This approach fails to give due deference to the State
Constitution and to courts' final authority to ‘say what the law is.’” Id. at 12, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 484, quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
267. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.

430
ii.

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

Eliminating Non-starters: Possible Reasons for the Supreme Court’s Dismissal
of the Case Without Conducting a Remedial Phase or Granting a Remedy that
are not Supported by the Record

(1) The Court’s Decision in ISEEO V Clearly Contemplated Remedial Proceedings
in that Court or, at the Very Least, an Assessment by the Court Concerning
Legislative Compliance with its Constitutional Duty
One possible explanation for the Court’s decision to dismiss the case without
conducting a remedial phase or granting a remedy involves the meaning and scope
of the Court’s Opinion in ISEEO V to retain jurisdiction. The Court’s statement
toward the end of that Opinion was quoted earlier and bears repeating here:
[W]e leave the policy decisions to that separate branch of government,
subject to our continuing responsibility to ensure Idaho's constitutional
provisions are satisfied.
… At this juncture, we will not remand the case to the district court, but
will retain jurisdiction to consider future legislative efforts to comply
with the constitutional mandate to provide a safe environment
conducive to learning so that we may exercise our constitutional role in
interpreting the constitution and assuring that its provisions are met.268
The above-quoted language clearly and unambiguously contemplated that
the Court was retaining jurisdiction to “exercise [its] . . . constitutional role” by
assessing the Legislature’s compliance with the Court’s decision in ISEEO V.269
Moreover, that conclusion follows based on the Court having concluded in ISEEO V
that the Legislature’s efforts concerning K-12 school funding, while
“commendable,” had not been sufficient to satisfy its state constitutional
obligation.270 Stated another way, there was nothing about the Court’s statement
at the conclusion of ISEEO V that remotely suggested that the Court meant to retain
jurisdiction so that it could capture and kill the case, i.e. dismiss the case without
assessing the Legislature’s subsequent efforts and compliance with its
thoroughness obligation, as the Kansas Supreme Court had done in the Montoy
matter. For these reasons, any suggestion that the Court’s eventual dismissal of the
ISEEO matter without addressing the remedial issue was proper cannot fairly be
based on the language in ISEEO V, which clearly set forth the Court’s continued
constitutional role.271
268. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 157 and 162 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 165 and 169 and accompanying text. After the Idaho Supreme Court Clerk
informed the attorneys in the ISEEO matter that the case was over, Idaho Supreme Court Justice Linda
Copple Trout, when questioned by a regional newspaper about the case being dismissed, stated that “I
think the [ISEEO V] opinion said that while we keep retaining authority to review what the legislature
does, as a policy matter, the decision about addressing these issues is up to the legislature. . . . We
thought it was clear, but apparently it’s not.” Betsy Z. Russell, High Court Washes Hands of School-Funding
Suit, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (September 9, 2006), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2006/sep/09/high-
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(2) Nothing in the Available Evidence Suggests that the Court Dismissed the
ISEEO Case because the Court believed that, post-ISEEO V, the Idaho
Legislature had Sufficiently Funded K-12 Schools to meet its Constitutional
Obligation
Another possible explanation for the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision to
dismiss the ISEEO case without addressing the remedies issue hinges on whether
the Court believed that, after ISEEO V, the Idaho Legislature had satisfied its
thoroughness obligation by sufficiently funding K-12 public schools.
Certainly, the Idaho Legislature took some steps after the Court’s ISEEO V
Opinion to increase funding for public schools.272 Specifically, the Legislature
focused on increasing funding for school facilities – the area of concern most
directly implicated by the Court’s narrow definition of thoroughness in ISEEO III –
by passing the School Facilities Improvement Act (“SFIA”) during the 2006
Legislative session.273 In turn, the SFIA, by creating an emergency fund to address
the most urgent school facilities needs and by funding school facilities from the
State general fund, tracked two of the policies suggested by the Court in ISEEO V to
the Legislature to address unsafe school facilities.274
Conversely, however, the ISEEO plaintiffs, in requesting that the Court
relinquish jurisdiction back to Judge Bail, filed a report taking the position that the
2006 Idaho Legislature had fallen woefully short of financially complying with its
state constitutional thoroughness obligation.275 More important, the Court never
received or evaluated evidence concerning the compliance issue, never conducted

court-washes-hands-of-school-funding-suit/, quoted in Jessica L. Tonn, Funding Advocates Accuse Idaho
High Court of ‘Cop-Out,’ EDUCATION WEEK (November 28, 2006), https://www.edweek.org/policypolitics/funding-advocates-accuse-idahos-high-court-of-cop-out/2006/11. The Court had been clear in
ISEEO V, but not in the manner suggested by Justice Copple Trout. The Court in ISEEO V, rather than
deciding the case would not have a remedial phase or the Court would not continue to scrutinize the
Idaho Legislature’s compliance with its obligation to adequately fund K-12 schools under the state
constitutional thoroughness provision, made clear (as did Justice Copple Trout’s in the first part of her
quoted remark) that Idaho Supreme Court review of the Legislature’s post-ISEEO V funding efforts was
envisioned by the Court.
272. Jeffrey J. Grieve, Note and Comment, When Words Fail: How Idaho’s Constitution Stymies
Education Spending and What Can Be Done About It, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 99, 109–11 & nn.81, 83 (2014).
273. Id. at 109 & n.73.
274. Id. at 110 & n.81; see supra note 167 and accompanying text. During a Special Legislative
session called by interim Governor Jim Risch in August 2006, the Idaho Legislature enacted the Property
Tax Relief Act (“PTRA”). Grieve, supra note 272 at 112 & n.88. The PTRA eliminated the state property
tax levy as a source of revenue supporting public schools and replaced that revenue source by raising the
sales tax by 1%. Id. at 112. In addition to providing property tax relief, the shift in the source of school
funding derailed a funding initiative backed by the state teachers’ union, the Idaho Education
Association, which likewise sought to increase the sales tax by 1% to increase funding for Idaho public
schools. Kevin Richert, The 2006 Tax Shift Still Divides Idaho Leaders, IDAHO EDUCATION NEWS (August 25,
2016),
https://www.idahoednews.org/news/ten-years-later-tax-shift-still-divides-idaho-leaders/.
Overall, because of the PTRA’s slightly less than 1:1 replacement ratio as between sale tax and property
tax revenues and because of the decline in sales tax revenue during the 2008 Recission, the PTRA caused
a net reduction in public school funding. Id.; see also Grieve, supra note 272 at 112 & n.89.
275. See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
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a hearing concerning the matter, and never stated any reasons for dismissing the
case without addressing the remedial issues it left unanswered.276
For these reasons, there may possibly be some generalized disagreement
regarding whether the Idaho Legislature, during the 2006 Legislative Session,
complied with its constitutional thoroughness obligation, as defined by the Idaho
Supreme Court in ISEEO III and as applied to the then-existing K-12 funding system
in ISEEO V; however, it is clear that the Court never suggested that the Legislature
had adequately and thoroughly funded public schools at any time after its Opinion
in ISEEO V or at any time pertaining to its post-ISEEO V dismissal of the case.
iii. The Likely Reasons Why the Court Dismissed the ISEEO Matter Without
Conducting the Remedial Phase of the Case or Granting a Remedy
As discussed above, the Idaho Supreme Court, although ruling against the
State concerning liability issues in the ISEEO matter, deferred to the Legislature and
SBE regarding thoroughness standards and continued to commend the Legislature
concerning its efforts related to increasing K-12 public school funding long past the
time any continued deference and commendations might have been properly
due.277 However, the Court paid ultimate judicial deference to the other two
branches of state government by dismissing the ISEEO case without exploring the
need for or without granting a remedy. Although never explained or justified by the
Court, the Court’s decision dismissing the case was likely based on a combination
of buyer’s remorse, battle fatigue, and the Court’s lack of desire to provoke a
constitutional confrontation with the Legislature. These intertwined reasons—
related to school funding lawsuits generally and other Idaho and ISEEO case-specific
considerations—underlie this explanation.
(1) The Court Likely Suffered from Buyer’s Remorse
By the time the Court dismissed the case in 2007 without ordering a remedy,
it had the benefit (or curse) of fourteen years of hindsight since it determined in
1993 that ISEEO plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable in ISEEO I. During that time, the
Court well knew the tortuous path the case had taken over the course of six appeals.
Equally important, the Court also knew that, in all likelihood, if it were to conduct a
remedial phase of the case, and almost irrespective of whether it took a deferential
or aggressive stance toward the Legislature concerning the remedial issue,
additional years of litigation might follow. The Court also knew that, had it initially
joined the not insubstantial camp of State high courts who had declined to find the
case justiciable on separation of power and/or political questions grounds, it would
have avoided the past and likely future morass in which the Court found or likely
predicted for itself. Thus, at a very basic level, the Court’s decision to dismiss the
ISEEO matter constituted a judicial form of buyer’s remorse.

276. Grieve, supra note 272, at 109–11 & n.81 (describing the evidence regarding whether the
SFIA constituted an “adequate legislative response” as “murky,” pointing out that “[t]he Court has never
said whether the SFIA corrected the system's ills,” and concluding that the current system of funding
Idaho K-12 public education is inadequate).
277. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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(2) The Court Also Likely Suffered from Battle Fatigue
The Court’s dismissal order may have resulted from what school funding
scholars have referred to as battle fatigue.278 The Nebraska Supreme Court, who
decided not to join the battle in the first instance by finding a state education clause
challenge non-justiciable, justified its decision and warned its judicial brethren that
“[t]he landscape is littered with courts that have been bogged down in the legal
quicksand of continuous litigation and challenges to their states' school funding
systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into that Stygian swamp.”279 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court, under similar circumstance and with similar disdain,
pointed out that a fellow court in a nearby state (the New Jersey Supreme Court)
“has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education for more than
twenty-one years, consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court
attention. The volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a
chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of
a Legislature.”280
Several state Supreme Courts, including the Ohio and Texas high courts, who
failed to heed the above-quoted or similar judicial warnings when they initially
decided that state constitutional challenges to K-12 school funding systems were
justiciable, eventually decided, after many years of litigation, multiple appeals, and
recalcitrance and challenges to their authority by state legislatures, that the battle
over school funding was no longer worth it.281 For those courts, the remedial issue
was the point of disembarkation: “[r]emedial concerns . . . prompted most courts
that waded into the battle to retreat . . . . [C]ourts courageously declared a
constitutional violation but declined to specify a remedy or give guidance about
necessary remedial action out of deference to legislative prerogatives and
separation of powers.”282 And, state supreme courts who forced the remedial issue
wound up fighting contentious and protracted battles with their state legislatures.
Thus, as pointed out by Professor Joshua Weishart:
The few courts that have advanced resolutely into battle exercised less
judicial restraint, specifying a remedy or giving guidance about remedial
measures to cure the constitutional violation. The paradigm example
here is the New Jersey Supreme Court which “has been the most
aggressive of any in enforcing education rights and duties.” Its battle
has been waging in one form or another since the early 1970s. “If Ohio's
278. Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights and Remedies, 27 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 346,
349 (2018) [hereinafter Aligning Education Rights] (citing Obhof, Ohio’s Long Road, supra note 121 at
140).
279. Nebraska Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007).
280. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995).
281. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights, supra note 278 at 347–49, (citing DeRolph v. State, 780
N.E.2d 529, 529–32 (Ohio 2002)) (“DeRolph IV”); Albert Kauffman, The Texas Supreme Court Retreats
from Protecting Texas Students, 19 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 145, 151, 164, 168 n.173 (2017).
282. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights, supra note 278, at 348, (citing to Bauries, Judicial
Review of Educational Adequacy, supra note 243, at 742) (identifying courts in eleven states that have
engaged in such “remedial abstention”); see supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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struggle seems exhausting, New Jersey endured the legal equivalent of
the Thirty Years' War.” Make that a Forty Years' War, provoking more
than twenty decisions in which the court has taken the state to task for
failing to adequately and equitably fund schools.
***
The New Jersey Supreme Court is not alone in bearing the scars of
battle. In an unprecedented move, the Washington Supreme Court was
forced to impose contempt sanctions ($100,000 per day) on the
legislature for its repeatedly (sic) failure to devise a remedial school
finance plan as ordered . . . . In Kansas, the “War of Judicial
Independence” culminated in a “well-financed effort to unseat four
Supreme Court justices,” with all four nevertheless winning their
retention elections. In the buildup to that effort, the legislature
purported to strip the court of authority to enjoin funding and to
appoint chief judges, threatened to change the means of judicial
selection to exert more control over the process, and imposed
deadlines for issuing appellate decisions.283
At the time of its dismissal order, the Idaho Supreme Court was, of course,
well aware of the history of the ISEEO litigation, including, among other things, the
efforts by the Legislature “to legislate itself out of [the ISEEO] lawsuit” in an
unconstitutional manner by enacting HB 403284 and the Legislature’s failure to
sufficiently fund K-12 public schools under its thoroughness obligation under the
Idaho Constitution.285 Thus, as of the date of its decision in ISEEO V, the Court knew
that the ISEEO matter had been hotly contested by the Legislature for almost fifteen
years and also knew that litigation concerning the remedial phase of the case could
potentially prolong the case for many more years. Undoubtedly, the Court, at the
time it issued its dismissal order, was also aware of the battles that had been waged
or were still waging between the judiciaries and legislatures in several other states
over school funding matters.
For these additional reasons, battle fatigue may have caused or contributed
to the Court’s decision to dismiss the ISEEO case in 2006 without addressing
remedial issues or granting a remedy.
(3) The Court Likely Wanted to Avoid a Constitutional Confrontation with the
Legislature
The Idaho Supreme Court’s dismissal of the ISEEO case—a case against the
State legislature where the Court has held that the legislature has violated the state
constitution and where the dismissal avoided addressing the remedial phase of the
case or granting a remedy— was, at a very basic level, a paradigmatic example of a
court avoiding a constitutional confrontation with the legislature. However, the
reasons—stated or unstated—underlying the dismissal order are crucial because
283. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights, supra note 278, at 349–50 (citations omitted).
284. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 136, 155 and 162 and accompanying text.
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those reasons will inform the evaluation of whether the decision to avoid further
confrontation with the Legislature was jurisprudentially proper or not.
On the one hand, if the Court had decided it was not proper under separation
of powers principles and Idaho’s tripartite system of state government for the Court
to be adjudicating remedial issues in the ISEEO matter, the Court’s decision for that
reason, although properly subject to severe criticism, would have had some
semblance of legitimacy. Indeed, it would have fallen within the range of judicial
decision making concerning state education clause litigation, i.e. would have been
within the “final third” of cases, discussed previously by Bauries and other
scholars.286 On the other hand, if the Court’s decision to dismiss was motivated by
concerns about further legislative backlash, i.e. backlash beyond HB 403, to the
Court’s performing its constitutional duties in the ISEEO matter, then the bona fides
of the decision may be seriously questioned (and the reasons why the Court never
provided the reasons for its dismissal decision would be better understood). At least
two important factors—one stemming directly from the Court’s ISEEO decisions
themselves and the other related to the Legislature’s control over funding to the
Court—point to the latter explanation.
In ISEEO VI, the Court affirmed Judge Bail’s decision requiring the State to pay
the special master’s fees during the pendency of the litigation from the State
general fund.287 Although seemingly not a momentous decision at the time—
particularly since the Court had retained jurisdiction over the ISEEO matter in ISEEO
V 288 and Judge Bail had confirmed and followed the Court’s order by staying
proceedings in the trial court shortly thereafter289 —the Court’s decision concerning
the State’s obligation to pay the special master’s fees had significant implications
for the Legislature. Paying the special master’s fees from the general fund meant
that, if the remedial phase of the case went forward, the Legislature would have an
obligation to finance a not insignificant portion of the expenses associated with the
development of facts that might ultimately lead to the Legislature having to
substantially increase funding for K-12 public education. As pointed out by Justice
Kidwell in dissenting from the Court’s decision in ISEEO VI, the Court’s decision
affirming Judge Bail’s order meant that the Court, in effect, was requiring the
Legislature to appropriate funds on an ongoing basis.290 According to Justice
Kidwell, this turn of events raised significant separation of powers concerns beyond
those already implicated in the case due to the Legislature’s near exclusive
constitutional prerogative concerning the “power of the purse.”291 Certainly, both
the Court and Legislature knew the implications of the Court’s decision concerning
286. See supra notes 243–249 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 169 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
291. Id.; IDAHO CONST. art. XIII § 4 provides that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury,
but in pursuance of appropriations made by law.” The Court has long held and recently reiterated that
“[t]he legislature has absolute control over the finances of the state. The power of the legislature as to
the creation of indebtedness, or the expenditure of state funds, or making appropriations, is plenary,
except only as limited by the state Constitution.” Davis v. Moon, 289 P.2d 614, 617, 77 Idaho 146, 151
(1955) (cited in Ybarra v. Legislature by Bedke, 466 P.3d 421, 432, 166 Idaho 902 (2020)).
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funding the services of the special master. At the very least, the Court’s incursion
into this aspect of the Legislature’s domain heightened the prospect that the
Legislature would be less than receptive to broader remedial measures imposed by
the Court.
The Legislature’s control over the State’s purse strings also had (and has)
implications for the Court’s own operations. In Idaho, like most states, the
Legislature has authority over appropriations for the state judiciary, including the
Idaho Supreme Court.292 Notwithstanding the Idaho high court’s inherent power
and constitutional right to operate the judicial system free of interference from the
Legislature,293 the prospect of the Legislature cutting its judicial budget in
retaliation for the Court’s handling of the ISEEO matter was real, not imagined.294
Thus, the Court had ample incentive to abdicate its remedial role in the ISEEO
matter to avoid a confrontation with the Legislature and, thereby, preserve its own
funding for staff, facilities and other essential aspects of the Court’s operations.295
In sum, a combination of buyer’s remorse, battle fatigue, and concern about
confrontation with the Legislature may have caused the Court to dismiss the ISEEO
matter in 2006 without conducting remedial proceedings or granting a remedy.

292. CARL BARR, SEPARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN THE AMERICAN STATES 25 (1975) (cited
in Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 PACE L. REV. 111, 122 (1994));
State v. Bennion, 720 P.2d 952, 968, 112 Idaho 32, 48 (1986) (Bistline, J., neither concurring nor
dissenting) (noting that the Idaho judicial system makes budget requests annually to the legislature).
293. See IDAHO CONST. art. V § 13 (“The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the
government”); see also Twin Falls Cty. v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 146 P.3d 664, 667, 143 Idaho 398,
401 (2005) (stating that the Idaho Supreme Court has “’inherent authority to incur and order paid all
such expenses as are necessary for the holding of court and the administration of the duties of courts of
justice’”) (quoting Schmelzel v. Board of Comm’rs of Ada County, 100 P. 106, 107, 16 Idaho 32, 35 (1909))
294. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to Representational Adequacy:
A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1633 (2018)
(noting that, in educational adequacy cases, “[r]emedial orders may be ignored. Legislators who do not
want courts telling them how much to spend or where to spend it may retaliate by cutting the judiciary’s
budget”); Deborah Fauver, ABA Commission Recommends All Judges Be Appointed, ST. LOUIS DAILY REC.,
July 2, 2003 (finding that legislatures have cut judicial budgets in a number of states out of retaliation for
adverse decisions).
295. During the 2021 Legislative Session, the Idaho Legislature twice withheld funding or
attempted to withhold funding from state educational entities or offices with whom a majority of the
Legislature disagreed ideologically – first, from Boise State University because of its adoption and
maintenance of a curriculum that contained a significant diversity and social justice component, Blake
Hunter, Idaho Legislative Committee Cuts $409,000 from Boise State’s Budget Over Social Justice, ARBITER
(March 4, 2021), https://arbiteronline.com/2021/03/04/breaking-idaho-legislative-committee-cuts409000-from-boise-states-budget-over-social-justice/; Kevin Richert, ‘We are Left with No Other
Options:’ Lawmakers Cut Into Boise State’s Budget, IDAHO EDUC. NEWS (March 3, 2021),
https://www.idahoednews.org/legislature/we-are-left-with-no-other-option-lawmakers-cut-into-boisestates-budget/, and, second, from the Idaho Attorney General’s Office because it did not join a lawsuit
filed by a number of other States Attorney General Offices challenging the outcome of the 2020
Presidential election (which lawsuit was immediately dismissed by the United States Supreme Court).
Alexandra Garrett, Idaho GOP Proposing to Cut Attorney General Lawrence Wasden’s Budget, Prevent
Certain Investigations, NEWSWEEK (March 9, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/idaho-gop-proposingcut-attorney-general-lawrence-wasdens-budget-prevent-certain-investigations-1574903; William L.
Spence, Washington Attorney General Defends his Idaho Counterpart for Resisting Texas Lawsuit,
LEWISTON TRIBUNE (REPRINTED BY THE SEATTLE TIMES) (April 1, 2021), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/washington-attorney-general-defends-his-idaho-counterpart-for-resisting-texas-lawsuit/.
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c. Assessing the Legitimacy of the Idaho Supreme Court’s Dismissal Decision in
ISEEO or, in Other Words, Was the Court’s Decision Proper?
i. Because the Court Failed to Fulfill its Proper Role Under the Idaho Constitution,
its Decision Dismissing the ISEEO Matter was Improper
As discussed previously, the case law and scholarship on what constitutes
proper judicial decision making in state constitutional school funding cases is both
voluminous and contains divergent and legitimate points of view.296 As such, any
assessment of the bona fides of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss the
ISEEO matter without addressing remedial issues or granting a remedy largely
hinges on the perspective one adopts concerning the proper role of courts vis a vis
the legislature on issues of enforcement and remediation under state education
clause provisions. In other words, an answer to the question, “Was the Court’s
decision proper?” depends on whether one takes the view that the Court’s proper
role in adjudicating claims under the education clause provisions of Idaho’s
Constitution calls for abstention, abdication, dialogue or remediation.297
Based on essentially the same reasons that state Supreme Courts outside of
Idaho, as well as scholars have taken the position that courts should and must take
an active role in enforcing state constitutional education clause provisions and
remedying their violation,298 this Article adopts the view that the Idaho Supreme
Court, after concluding in ISEEO V that the Legislature had not fulfilled its state
constitutional duty to provide a thorough education for Idaho’s K-12 public
schoolchildren, was constitutionally duty bound to take an active role in monitoring
and ultimately requiring compliance with its decision. As such, the Court—either
directly (by retaining jurisdiction, as it did) or by remanding the matter to Judge
Bail—should have done far more than it did after delivering its Opinion in ISEEO V.
Specifically, depending on the nature of the Legislature’s response to its ISEEO V
Opinion and any follow-on orders, the Court should have used the special master
to engage in factfinding,299 adopted specific requirements or benchmarks for school
funding,300 set specific deadlines for legislative compliance301 or, although one
would hope the compliance issue would not have come to this, utilized the Court’s
contempt power to enforce its orders.302 In short, the Court should have conducted
the remedial phase of the case that it had promised in ISEEO V, but never delivered.
By not engaging in this more forceful remedial role, the Court failed to fulfill
Marbury v. Madison’s legacy of “saying what the law is”303 as it had done concerning
296. See supra notes 243–248 and accompanying text.
297. Id.
298. See supra notes 243, 247 and 248 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 183.
300. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998).
301. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997).
302. See, e.g., McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 at 4 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014) (cited with approval in
Education Law — Washington Supreme Court Holds Legislature in Contempt for Failing to Make
Adequate Progress Toward Remedying Unconstitutional Education Funding Scheme, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2048 (2015)).
303. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also supra note 266.
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the liability phase of the case in ISEEO I and III, but also failed to comport with
Marbury’s and Blackstone’s “indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded.”304 By dismissing the
case, the Court denied the ISEEO plaintiffs their full day in court, thereby denying
them relief after telling them they had rights and their rights had been violated.305
But more important, the Court, by abdicating its remedial role, failed, along with
the Legislature, to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to ensure that Idaho’s
schoolchildren receive a thorough education as that term had been interpreted by
the Court. As pointed out by Professor Weishart in discussing the consequences of
judicial abdication in school funding cases across the United States:
Ceding authority to interpret and enforce the education clauses in their
constitutions, however, . . . [comes] at a high cost: the right to
education in those states has been downgraded to a nominal,
nonjusticiable
duty.
As
collateral
damage,
millions
of schoolchildren with claims under that right lack a legal remedy
because the judicial branch of government is essentially closed to them,
perhaps indefinitely. Judicial restraint rather than abdication would
have been more defensible, considering that the source of judges'
trepidation lies not with their authority to interpret the constitution but
their ability to enforce it with a remedy that the other branches would
be willing and able to execute.306
As Weishart further describes, judicial abdication at the remedial stage of
school funding litigation and the resulting failure “to protect children from the
harms of educational deprivations and disparities”307 has very specific
consequences for a State, its citizenry and its schoolchildren:
In a number of states, the education clauses . . . declare explicitly why
a quality education matters: It is “essential to the preservation of rights
and liberties of the people” and to a “free,” “good,” or “republican
form” of government “by the people.” Several courts have also
acknowledged that education for citizenship is democracy-reinforcing
absent such explicit language in the state constitution. Courts have
been unequivocal about the importance of education to the common
good—as one put it, the state is “dependent for its survival on citizens
who are able to participate intelligently in the political, economic, and
social functions of our system.” Regarding those economic functions, a
few state constitutions specifically identify “commerce, trades,
manufactures” as well as “vocational,” “mining,” “agricultural,”
“scientific,” and “industrial” improvements as dependent on an
educated workforce. Again, even where state constitutions are not that
specific, courts interpreting them have said that education
equips children with the capabilities “to attain productive employment
304.
305.
306.
307.

See supra note 209.
See supra note 196.
Weishart, Aligning Education Rights, supra note 278, at 353.
Id. at 347.
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and otherwise contribute to the state's economy,” “to compete
favorably” on the job market, and “lead economically productive lives
to the benefit [of] us all.” 308
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court initially fulfilled its proper constitutional role
in ISEEO I and III by holding the Legislature accountable for complying with its
thoroughness obligation under Art. IX, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution,
compliance with which Idaho’s founders thought was necessary to enhance “the
intelligence of the people” so as to promote “[t]he stability of a republican form of
government.”309 However, the Court, by abdicating its remedial role after ISEEO V,
failed to fulfill its remedial duties, properly understood—to the ISEEO plaintiffs, to
be sure, but more profoundly, to Idaho, its citizens and its schoolchildren.310
ii. The Court’s Failure to Conduct a Hearing or Issue an Opinion Explaining its
Dismissal Order Compounded the Problem
The Idaho Supreme Court has stressed the importance of due process,
agreeing with the United States Supreme Court that “’the phrase expresses the
requirement of ‘fundamental fairness.’”311 Specifically, the Idaho high court has
indicated the right to a hearing is an important aspect of due process312 and that
“[a] fair and open hearing is the absolute demand of all judicial inquiry.”313 Similarly,
many years ago, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a quasi-judicial
administrative proceeding and stated that “the rudimentary requirements of fair
play . . . . demand ‘a fair and open hearing'—essential alike to the legal validity of
the [proceeding] and to the maintenance of public confidence in the value and

308. Id. at 361–62 (citations omitted).
309. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
310. As a dissenting justice lamented regarding the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in its school
funding litigation and its effect on schoolchildren:
The majority's remarkable willingness to abandon precedent so recently
announced demonstrates not only disregard for the law and indifference to the taxpayer,
but also abandonment of the children of this state. Our school children have long suffered
from the failure of the school finance system. Today they suffer anew from the failure of
the justice system to deliver on the promise of the Texas Constitution. The majority offers
our children only delay, and they have already had plenty of that. A child who began the
first grade when this cause was originally filed in state court is already in high school and
will probably have graduated before any new finance plan becomes effective.
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 576
(Tex. 1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting).
311. Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 337 P.3d 655, 664, 157 Idaho 496, 505
(2014) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981)).
312. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bonner County School Dist. No.82, 887 P.3d 35, 35–39, 126 Idaho 490,
490–94 (1994).
313. Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 574 P.2d 902, 907, 98 Idaho 860, 865
(1978).
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soundness of this important governmental process.”314 In the same vein, Justice
Felix Frankfurter opined concerning the right to be heard as follows:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the
mode by which it has been reached . . . . No better instrument has been
devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious
loss notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it. Nor
has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to
a popular government, that justice has been done.315
The Idaho Supreme Court has likewise held that providing a statement of
reasons as part of the quasi-judicial or judicial decision making process is often a
requirement of due process.316 Thus, the Idaho high court, applying a three-factor
due process test articulated by the United States Supreme Court, held that a
teacher who was discharged after a school board hearing is entitled to know the
reasons for the board’s decision, stating as follows:
First, the interest of a teacher with renewable contract rights is
substantial. Secondly, the administrative cost of providing a statement
of reasons would be minimal. We discern no ancillary disruptive effect
on administrative efficiency. Thirdly, the benefits of such a requirement
are evident. It dispenses with the appearance of arbitrariness which
attends a discharge without explanation; encourages the board to
come to grips with and articulate its reasoning process; encourages
fairness by holding the decision up for public and judicial scrutiny; [and]
enhances the visibility of the decision making process . . . . 317
As discussed above, the ISEEO matter involved issues of unsurpassed
importance to the ISEEO plaintiffs (and the State official defendants), as well as the
citizens and schoolchildren of Idaho. In addition, affording the ISEEO plaintiffs a
hearing before dismissing the case could have been easily accomplished, would
have given them the opportunity to (a) present argument concerning both the
meaning of the Court’s ISEEO V Opinion retaining jurisdiction and the Court’s proper
role vis a vis the remedial phase of the case and (b) present evidence concerning
whether, post-ISEEO V, the Legislature had complied with its thoroughness
obligation under the Idaho Constitution. Similarly, providing reasons for the Court’s
dismissal order in ISEEO – again, a case of significant statewide importance – in an
Opinion, Memorandum of Decision, or the like would not have burdened the Court
in any significant way, would have forced the Court to articulate its reasoning
process and justify its decision, and would have informed the ISEEO plaintiffs, the
314. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 15 (1938).
315. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Professor Laurence Tribe has described procedural due process and the right to be heard as
having both instrumental and intrinsic aspects. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at
666-67 (2d ed. 1988). The instrumental aspect leads to accurate decision making, while the intrinsic
aspect gives an individual or group whose rights are being affected the feeling that they have been heard.
Id.
316. Bowler v. Bd. of Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 392, 617 P.2d 841, 847, 101 Idaho 537, 543 (1980).
317. Id. at 847–48, 101 Idaho at 543–44 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
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State defendants and all others interested in the case of the reasons for the Court’s
dismissal decision.
Instead, the Court dismissed the ISEEO matter without addressing the
remedial phase of the case or granting a remedy by having its Court Clerk inform
the attorneys for the parties in the hallways of the Supreme Court building that “the
case is over,” not conducting any kind of hearing, and not issuing any kind of
Opinion or writing explaining the reasons for its dismissal decision. Given the
Court’s championing of fair procedures and due process, a more arbitrary way to
end a case that had spanned seventeen years and spawned six state Supreme Court
opinions would be hard to imagine.
C. Possible Paths Forward after ISEEO
Certainly, the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in ISEEO dismissing the case
without granting a remedy dashed the hopes of the ISEEO plaintiffs and others who
looked to the Court to force the Legislature to comply with its school funding
obligations under the Idaho Constitution’s thoroughness provision. Moreover,
given the Court’s 2007 dismissal decision, 318 over fourteen years have now passed
since the Legislature last faced any possible form of compulsion to increase K-12
school funding. The question, then, arises whether there are any means presently
available to require the Legislature to provide constitutionally sufficient funding to
Idaho’s K-12 public schools. Two possibilities – one premised on subsequent
litigants enforcing the Court’s liability determination against the State in ISEEO V
and the other involving Idaho’s citizens’ initiative process – are worth discussing.
1.

Under Preclusion Doctrines, the Idaho Supreme Court’s Justiciability and
Liability Decisions in ISEEO Could be Used to Aid New School Funding
Litigants and the Court’s Dismissal Decision Would not Bar New Litigants
from Seeking a Remedy

Like courts in most jurisdictions, the Idaho Supreme Court recognizes finality
doctrines, variously described as issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) and claim
preclusion (res judicata).319 The preclusion doctrine encompasses both issue
preclusion and claim preclusion and “serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it
preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive
disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent
results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens
of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose from the
harassment of repetitive claims.”320
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the following five elements must be
satisfied for the doctrine of issue preclusion to apply:

318. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
319. Carter v. Gateway Park, LLC, No. 47246, 2020 WL 6387860, *5 (Nov.2, 2020) (citing Ticor
Title v. Stanion, 157 P.3d 613, 617, 144 Idaho 119, 123 (2007).
320. Id.
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(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the present action;
(2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded
was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against
whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the
litigation.321
The Court has also made clear that, although a dismissal may or may not
constitute a final judgment for claim preclusion purposes, “for purposes of issue
preclusion, a final judgment ‘includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another
action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive
effect.’”322 As to the other preclusion doctrine, the Court has stated that “[f]or claim
preclusion to bar a subsequent action, there are three requirements: (1) same
parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.”323
Although the preclusion doctrines have not seen much application in the
school funding context,324 erstwhile plaintiffs who might want to pursue post-ISEEO
school funding litigation in Idaho should be able to benefit from the ISEEO plaintiffs’
successes and would not be stymied by the Court’s decision dismissing the matter
without granting a remedy. Tracking the elements of the issue preclusion doctrine,
the State defendants clearly had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the ISEEO
matter, including the Court’s justiciability determination in plaintiffs’ favor in ISEEO
I and the Court’s affirmance of Judge Bail’s liability determination in the plaintiffs’
favor in ISEEO V. In addition, the issue in any follow-on litigation would be identical
to the primary issue resolved in the ISEEO case, i.e. whether the Legislature has
continued to violate the thoroughness requirements of the Idaho Constitution.
Further, the justiciability and liability issues under Idaho’s thoroughness provision
321. Ticor, 157 P.3d at 618, 144 Idaho at 24.
322. Rodriguez v. Dept. of Corr., 29 P.3d 401, 405, 136 Idaho 90, 94 (2001) (quoting Eastern Idaho
Agric. Credit Ass’n v. Neibaur, 987 P.2d 314, 320 ,133 Idaho 402, 408 (1999) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982))); see also Picatta v. Miner, 449 P.3d 403, 412, 165 Idaho 611, 620
(2019).
323. Andrus v. Nicholson, 186 P.3d 630, 633, 145 Idaho 774, 777 (2008) (citing Ticor, 157 P.3d at
618, 144 Idaho at 24).
324. One Idaho Supreme Court justice invoked res judicata, i.e. claim preclusion, as grounds for
barring the ISEEO plaintiffs from relitigating the Idaho and federal equal protection claims that had been
decided adversely to plaintiffs in the Thompson litigation, ISEEO I, 850 P.2d at 738, 123 Idaho at 587
(Bakes, J. pro tem., concurring in part and dissenting in part), although given that the ISEEO plaintiffs
were not parties to the Thompson litigation, the Thompson Court’s equal protection rulings might more
properly be regarded as stare decisis, rather than res judicata, for the ISEEO litigation. Outside of Idaho,
preclusion doctrine principles barred a plaintiff from relitigating a school funding case in Washington
state, where she had previously been a plaintiff in prior unsuccessful litigation. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 762 P.2d 356, 359 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). One scholar has discussed the State defendants
unsuccessful attempt in Ohio to use res judicata principles to preclude plaintiffs from pursuing the
DeRolph matter. William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-making in Educational Policy Reform
Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 1077, 1146 (2004). And, in Rhode Island, commentators have discussed
possible preclusion issues stemming from state court school funding litigation in contemplated federal
court litigation related to some of the issues litigated in state court. David V. Abbott & Stephen M.
Robinson, School Finance Litigation: The Viability of Bringing Suit in Rhode Island Federal District Court,
5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 441, 487–88 (2000).
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were actually decided in the ISEEO litigation. Moreover, the Court’s justiciability and
liability determination against the State defendants were certainly not tentative,
but rather, were sufficiently firm so as to be accorded conclusive effect in any
subsequent Idaho school funding case seeking to enforce Idaho’s constitutional
thoroughness requirement. And, of course, the Legislature was a party defendant
throughout the ISEEO matter litigation. Thus, any subsequent plaintiffs seeking to
enforce the thoroughness provision of Idaho’s Constitution could make a strong
argument, based on the elements of the issue preclusion doctrine and its underlying
purpose encouraging enforcement of rulings on issues fairly and finally determined,
that they should reap the benefits of the Court’s prior rulings in the liability phase
of the case and not have to litigate those issues a second time.
Conversely, plaintiffs in a follow-on school funding suit would not be barred
by either of the preclusion doctrines from revisiting – and have the Court take up
for the first time – the remedial issues left unresolved in the ISEEO matter. As a
matter of issue preclusion, the remedial issue was never actually litigated in the
ISEEO matter. Likewise, as to claim preclusion, any subsequent plaintiffs would
almost certainly not be the same plaintiffs who litigated the ISEEO matter.325 As
such, recognizing that the costs of, including attorneys’ fees associated with,
ligating a school funding case can be prohibitive for client or counsel and further
recognizing that the ISEEO plaintiffs’ prior experience with the Court and Legislature
might dissuade a prospective plaintiff from taking up the matter, the preclusion
doctrines appear to play in a plaintiff’s favor and against the State defendants –
with one caveat. Based on the Supreme Court’s holding in the Joki matter, any
plaintiff who might wish to take up the ISEEO plaintiffs’ cause must satisfy Idaho’s
CBECA’s procedural requirements by first suing in district court and then obtaining
authorization from the district court to add the State as a defendant. 326
2.

The Idaho Citizens’ Initiative Process is Available to K-12 School Funding
Advocates as Well

Idaho, like several Western states, allows direct participation by citizens in
lawmaking by providing for an initiative and referendum process in the Idaho

325. An issue may arise in any subsequent Idaho school funding litigation concerning whether
the final judgment requirement for invocation of the claim preclusion doctrine is satisfied by a dismissal
order where the remedial issue was not actually litigated in the case. The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that a dismissal order entered based on the stipulation of the parties constituted a final judgment for
claim preclusion purposes. Maravilla v. J. R. Simplot Co., 387 P.3d 123, 126–27, 161 Idaho 455, 458–59
(2016). In contrast, the Idaho high court refused to afford claim preclusion to a prior decision where, in
a court trial, defendant moved for directed verdict on plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff did not oppose the motion
and the trial judge issued a dismissal order, but the trial judge did not make findings under Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure (“IRCP”) 52(a) and did not certify partial judgment under IRCP 54(a). Pocatello Hosp., LLC
v. Quail Ridge Medical Inv’r, LLC, 339 P.3d 1136, 1143, 157 Idaho 732, 739 (2014). Thus, although the
“same parties” requirement for claim preclusion purposes can easily be evaluated and disposed of, the
resolution of the final judgment issue under the claim preclusion is not entirely clear.
326. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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Constitution.327 Because the constitutional provision is not self-executing,328 the
Idaho Legislature has provided for the initiative process by statute.329 In order to
qualify a citizens’ initiative for the ballot, the proponents of the initiative must,
among other things, place the language of the initiative on a petition, garner a
sufficient number of signatures from qualified electors in a number of counties
within a certain time frame, and once the initiative is placed on the ballot, obtain
the vote of a majority of those voting in the general election.330
In September 2019, a citizens’ group calling themselves Reclaim Idaho began
circulating an initiative petition entitled “Invest in Idaho.”331 The initiative, if it
qualified for the ballot and was approved by the voters, would have raised
approximately $170 million annually by increasing corporate and high-end income
tax rates.332 By early-March 2020, signature gatherers for the Invest in Idaho
initiative had obtained approximately 30,000 of the 55,000 signatures needed by
the statutory April 30, 2020 deadline to place the initiative on the ballot for the
November 2020 election.333 In effect, the Reclaim Idaho citizens group was
attempting to achieve by ballot initiative what the ISEEO plaintiffs had not been
able to obtain through the litigation process.
However, in mid-March 2020, Idaho suffered its first case of the COVID-19
pandemic.334 From that point forward, the pandemic made face-to-face signature
gathering essentially impossible.335 In June, 2020, after Idaho state officials denied
Reclaim Idaho’s request to gather signatures on-line, Reclaim Idaho filed a lawsuit
in federal court asserting that Idaho had violated its First Amendment rights and
would continue to do so by refusing to allow it to gather signatures electronically.336
In late June 2020, Judge Winmill agreed, issuing a preliminary injunction requiring
the State to either agree to place the Invest in Idaho initiative on the November
327. Brian Kane, If the Citizens Speak, Listen: Idaho’s Local Initiative Process, 50 ADVOC. 17, 17
(2007). Art. III, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides in pertinent part regarding the initiative power as
follows:
The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws, and enact the same at the
polls independent of the legislature. This power is known as the initiative, and legal voters
may, under such conditions and in such manner as may be provided by acts of the
legislature, initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to the vote
of the people at a general election for their approval or rejection.
328. Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1135, 110 Idaho 691, 697 (1986).
329. IDAHO CODE §§ 34-1801 (1997) through § 34-1823 (1997).
330. Id.
331. Kevin Richert, Reclaim Idaho Launches Education Funding Initiative, IDAHO EDUC. NEWS (Sept.
30, 2019), https://www.idahoednews.org/kevins-blog/reclaim-idaho-launches-education-fundinginitiative/ [hereinafter “Richert I”]; Kevin Richert, Reclaim Idaho Launches Online Petition Drive for K-12
Proposal, IDAHO EDUC. NEWS (July 13, 2020), https://www.idahoednews.org/news/reclaim-idaholaunches-online-petition-drive-for-k-12-proposal/.
332. Id.
333. Kevin Richert, Federal Judge Revives Reclaim Idaho Initiative, IDAHO EDUC. NEWS (June 23,
2020), https://www.idahoednews.org/news/federal-judge-revives-reclaim-idaho-initiative/.
334. Kevin Richert, Reclaim Idaho Launches Online Petition Drive for K-12 Proposal, IDAHO EDUC.
NEWS (July 13, 2020) https://www.idahoednews.org/news/reclaim-idaho-launches-online-petitiondrive-for-k-12-proposal/.
335. Id.
336. Reclaim Idaho v. Little, 469 F. Supp.3d 988, 992–97 (D. Idaho 2020).
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2020 ballot or “allow Reclaim Idaho an additional 48-days to gather signatures
through online solicitation and submission.”337
The State refused to accept either alternative, eventually filing a petition for
certiorari and stay of Judge Winmill’s order with the United States Supreme
Court.338 The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for stay on July 30, 2020,
thereby effectively ending Reclaim Idaho’s Invest in Idaho initiative efforts at least
until the next general election in November 2022.339
Reclaim Idaho’s use of Idaho’s initiative process to garner voter approval of a
substantial infusion of funds into Idaho’s K-12 public schools was a direct response
– albeit a response delayed by many years – to the Idaho Legislature’s failure to
sufficiently fund public education in violation of the thoroughness requirements of
the Idaho Constitution dating back to the ISEEO matter and before and the Idaho
Supreme Court’s failure to conduct the remedial phase of the case or grant a
remedy to the ISEEO plaintiffs.340 To be sure, pursuing or continuing to pursue the
initiative process to substantially increase funding to Idaho K-12 public schools has
not been and would continue not to be easy. Certainly, many Idaho voters hold an
anti-taxation sentiment.341 In addition, the Idaho legislature has placed and
continues to seek to place increasing strictures on the signature gathering and time
line requirements for qualifying a citizens’ initiative on the ballot.342 And, even if
voters approve an initiative to substantially increase funding for K-12 public schools,
Idaho law permits the Idaho legislature to amend or negate the initiative’s
provisions at the Legislature’s next regular session.343 These realities, taken either
singularly or in the aggregate, would pose substantial barriers to direct democratic
action by Idaho voters to address public school funding problems in the State.

337. Id. at 1002.
338. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020).
339. Id. at 2616; see also Reclaim Idaho v. Little, 826 Fed. Appx. 592, 594 (9th Cir. 2020).
340. As previously discussed, the Idaho Education Association had previously used the initiative
process to increase the sales tax to provide additional funding for K-12 public schools. See supra note
274. Idaho voters, however, rejected that initiative. Id.
341. Richert I, supra note 331.
342. James Dawson, New Bill Revives Idaho Ballot Initiative Restrictions, BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO (Feb.
12,
2021),
https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/new-bill-revives-idaho-ballot-initiativerestrictions#stream/0. During the 2021 Legislative Session, the Legislature enacted – and the Governor
signed into law – SB 1110, which places additional, severe limitations on Idaho’s initiative and
referendum process. Betsy Russell, Governor Has Signed SB 1110 on Future Voter Initiatives, IDAHO STATE
JOURNAL (April 19, 2021), https://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/governor-has-signed-sb-1110on-future-voter-initiatives/article_be0d8536-af52-5096-b5b4-be49ca20a157.html. Less than a month
later, two groups, including Reclaim Idaho, and one individual filed lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of SB 1110. Betsy Z. Russell, Lawsuits Filed to Overturn New Initiative Laws as
Unconstitutional,
BIG
COUNTRY
NEWS
(May
7,
2021)
https://www.bigcountrynewsconnection.com/news/state/idaho/lawsuits-filed-to-overturn-newinitiative-laws-as-unconstitutional/article_38eea084-b3df-563a-8225-ff5ee39a51c4.html. Just as this
Article was going to press, the Idaho Supreme Court struck down SB 1110 as unconstitutional under
Article III, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution. Reclaim Idaho/Gilmore v. Denney, Docket Nos. 48784 and
48760 (Opinion filed August 23, 2021).
343. Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 92 P.3d 1063, 1067, 140 Idaho 316, 320 (2002) (citing Luker v. Curtis,
136 P.2d 978, 979-80, 64 Idaho 703, 706-07 (1943)).
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However, K-12 public school referenda have worked for citizen groups before344
and, given the stakes involved – the education of Idaho schoolchildren and,
ultimately, the wellbeing of Idaho’s citizenry and progress of the State as a whole –
the possibility of using the citizen initiative process should not be discounted.
III. CONCLUSION
The Education Clause of Idaho’s Constitution constitutes a promise made by
Idaho’s founders to the citizens of Idaho and Idaho schoolchildren that the
Legislature would, among other things, establish and maintain a thorough system
of K-12 public schools. When all has been said and done – when one chronicles the
history of the lSEEO litigation with all its twists and turns, when one places the ISEEO
matter in the context of proper judicial decision making in state constitutional
funding adequacy challenges across the many states that have addressed the issue,
and when one looks at the high stakes involved – the Idaho Legislature and the
Idaho Supreme Court have broken this promise. But given the alternatives available
to those who are concerned about sufficiently funding Idaho’s public schools,
broken promises, although often long lasting, need not stay broken forever.

344. See BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO, Voters Resoundingly Reject Propositions 1, 2 and 3,
https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/topic/idaho-voters-resoundingly-reject-propositions-1-2-and3#stream/0. In 2012, Idaho voters, via referendum, overwhelming repealed the so-called Luna laws,
which had made sweeping changes to Idaho statutes protecting teacher rights and collective bargaining
and which diverted funding for teachers’ salaries to funding for laptop computers. Id.

